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Exam Code: JN0-650

Exam Name: Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT)

Certification Provider: Juniper

Corresponding Certification: JNCIP-ENT

Juniper JN0-650 Questions & Answers

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Juniper JN0-650 Practice Test 70

Question 690

At a Junos EVPN-VXLAN leaf-spine fabric, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A remote VTEP cannot locate a host MAC in another VXLAN segment even though the BGP EVPN session is established. The tenant traffic must remain isolated across the overlay. What verification result should the engineer expect?

  1. Each PE sees its expected remote multihoming peers and a consistent segment identity.
  2. A remote EVPN MAC table resolves the host to the expected originating VTEP.
  3. The remote IP-VRF learns the approved prefix with valid overlay next-hop resolution.
  4. Only matching tenant MAC and prefix advertisements enter each isolated EVPN instance.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For a Junos EVPN-VXLAN leaf-spine fabric, the decisive evidence is: A remote EVPN MAC table resolves the host to the expected originating VTEP. This validates the action: Verify the local MAC/IP advertisement and its acceptance through the correct EVPN instance. Because: EVPN route type 2 advertises MAC reachability and can include associated IP information for hosts. An unrelated successful test would not prove this specific issue is resolved.

Incorrect Answers

A:

EVPN Ethernet Segment route type 4 supports discovery of PEs connected to the same Ethernet segment. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Verify the local MAC/IP advertisement and its acceptance through the correct EVPN instance.

C:

EVPN route type 5 conveys IP prefix reachability and can support routed overlay designs. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: EVPN route type 2 advertises MAC reachability and can include associated IP information for hosts.

D:

EVPN route targets determine which routes are imported into the relevant EVPN instances and tenant contexts. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A remote VTEP cannot locate a host MAC in another VXLAN segment even though the BGP EVPN session is established. The tenant traffic must remain isolated across the overlay.

Question 691

At an enterprise core exchanging BGP routes over redundant WAN paths, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: An external BGP peering repeatedly fails negotiation because the configured peer AS differs from the neighbor's actual AS. The chosen route must have a valid data-plane next hop. Which limitation should guide the change control?

  1. Check local preference and next-hop reachability first because they can override this comparison.
  2. Account for protocol default export rules and route activity before assuming all table entries advertise.
  3. Verify provider documentation and do not broaden peer trust to arbitrary autonomous systems.
  4. Check security filters and route symmetry to avoid accidental distant-peer admission.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For an enterprise core exchanging BGP routes over redundant WAN paths, the relevant safeguard is: Verify provider documentation and do not broaden peer trust to arbitrary autonomous systems. It matters while implementing: Correct the peer-as setting for the specific external BGP neighbor and recheck the session. The fault involves: BGP OPEN messages carry AS information and external peers must agree on their intended local and remote AS relationship. The required acceptance result remains: show BGP neighbor reports Established with the expected external peer AS.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In Junos BGP best-path selection an eligible shorter AS path is generally preferred after higher-priority criteria tie. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Verify provider documentation and do not broaden peer trust to arbitrary autonomous systems.

B:

BGP export policy controls which eligible active routes the speaker announces to selected neighbors. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: BGP OPEN messages carry AS information and external peers must agree on their intended local and remote AS relationship.

D:

A nonadjacent eBGP neighbor may require a compatible multihop TTL and suitable route to the remote endpoint. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: An external BGP peering repeatedly fails negotiation because the configured peer AS differs from the neighbor's actual AS. The chosen route must have a valid data-plane next hop.

Question 692

At a national enterprise designing OSPF between offices, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: An OSPF-enabled router has a reachable interface but has no adjacency on that subnet. The internal forwarding path must remain stable when one uplink fails. Which limitation should guide the change control?

  1. Check bidirectional traffic and backup capacity before adjusting link metrics.
  2. Verify both ends and vendor interoperability before changing interface type.
  3. Avoid applying IPv4 OSPF LSA type assumptions to OSPFv3 packet formats.
  4. Do not activate the routing protocol on an untrusted or management-facing interface accidentally.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For a national enterprise designing OSPF between offices, the relevant safeguard is: Do not activate the routing protocol on an untrusted or management-facing interface accidentally. It matters while implementing: Enable OSPF on the intended logical interface under the appropriate area and confirm its interface parameters. The fault involves: OSPF neighbor discovery requires the relevant logical interface to participate in the correct routing instance and area. The required acceptance result remains: The peer appears in show ospf neighbor and the local interface appears in show ospf interface.

Incorrect Answers

A:

OSPF shortest-path selection is driven by cumulative link metrics rather than a human label for preferred circuits. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Do not activate the routing protocol on an untrusted or management-facing interface accidentally.

B:

OSPF interface network type influences neighbor formation and whether DR and BDR election is used. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: OSPF neighbor discovery requires the relevant logical interface to participate in the correct routing instance and area.

C:

OSPFv3 interarea-prefix LSAs convey reachable IPv6 prefixes across area boundaries. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: An OSPF-enabled router has a reachable interface but has no adjacency on that subnet. The internal forwarding path must remain stable when one uplink fails.

Question 693

At a managed network team troubleshooting an internet edge, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Two route reflectors use inconsistent cluster settings and reflected path behavior differs after failover. The diagnosis must distinguish a healthy BGP session from eligible received routes. Which operational result would most clearly confirm the fix?

  1. Reflected routes contain expected cluster-list information and survive individual reflector failure.
  2. The authorized peer establishes while a test using incorrect credentials is refused.
  3. The neighbor receives the required BGP route despite a competing active non-BGP route.
  4. Reflector clients receive BGP routes from other clients through the reflector.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For a managed network team troubleshooting an internet edge, the decisive evidence is: Reflected routes contain expected cluster-list information and survive individual reflector failure. This validates the action: Align the designed cluster identifier among redundant reflectors serving the same cluster. Because: Route reflector cluster identifiers participate in loop detection on reflected BGP paths. An unrelated successful test would not prove this specific issue is resolved.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Compatible TCP-level BGP authentication methods can verify the configured neighbor relationship. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Align the designed cluster identifier among redundant reflectors serving the same cluster.

C:

Junos normally exports active routes; supported advertise-inactive can announce an eligible inactive BGP route in some cases. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: route reflector cluster identifiers participate in loop detection on reflected BGP paths.

D:

Ordinary iBGP split-horizon rules avoid re-advertising routes between iBGP peers; route reflectors provide controlled reflection. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Two route reflectors use inconsistent cluster settings and reflected path behavior differs after failover. The diagnosis must distinguish a healthy BGP session from eligible received routes.

Question 694

At an enterprise core exchanging BGP routes over redundant WAN paths, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A BGP update arrives containing the receiver's own AS in the AS-path and is rejected. The chosen route must have a valid data-plane next hop. What risk must the implementation avoid?

  1. Verify provider documentation and do not broaden peer trust to arbitrary autonomous systems.
  2. Avoid broad allow-as-in exceptions without a documented multi-AS design.
  3. Avoid setting next hop to self without confirming the chosen egress can actually forward the traffic.
  4. Do not claim origin always wins over local preference or AS-path length.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For an enterprise core exchanging BGP routes over redundant WAN paths, the relevant safeguard is: Avoid broad allow-as-in exceptions without a documented multi-AS design. It matters while implementing: Correct the unintended AS-path manipulation or routing leak rather than disabling loop protection. The fault involves: BGP AS-path loop detection normally prevents accepting routes already traversing the local autonomous system. The required acceptance result remains: The revised advertisement no longer contains an invalid local-AS loop and becomes eligible.

Incorrect Answers

A:

BGP OPEN messages carry AS information and external peers must agree on their intended local and remote AS relationship. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Avoid broad allow-as-in exceptions without a documented multi-AS design.

C:

A usable BGP route requires an eligible reachable forwarding next hop before it can become active. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: BGP AS-path loop detection normally prevents accepting routes already traversing the local autonomous system.

D:

BGP best-path selection considers origin type after higher-priority attributes, normally preferring IGP over EGP over incomplete. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A BGP update arrives containing the receiver's own AS in the AS-path and is rejected. The chosen route must have a valid data-plane next hop.

Question 695

At a hospital onboarding diverse employee devices, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A RADIUS server outage causes all access switches to block critical devices with no approved fallback behavior. Critical permitted endpoints need a documented authentication fallback. Which design objective is best served by this mechanism?

  1. Use EAPOL at the access link and RADIUS between the authenticator and authentication infrastructure.
  2. Use a reject VLAN to distinguish failed authentication from nonresponsive guest devices.
  3. Use server-fail policy for planned authorization behavior during authentication-server outages.
  4. Use MAC RADIUS as a controlled fallback for devices lacking 802.1X support.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For a hospital onboarding diverse employee devices, this mechanism fits the requirement: Use server-fail policy for planned authorization behavior during authentication-server outages. The design is appropriate because: Server fail fallback controls permit, deny, cached access or restricted VLAN assignment when authentication infrastructure is unavailable. In this scenario, the observed issue is: A RADIUS server outage causes all access switches to block critical devices with no approved fallback behavior. The corresponding implementation is: Set an explicit supported fallback policy and test a simulated RADIUS timeout.

Incorrect Answers

A:

In common 802.1X switching, the supplicant exchanges EAPOL with the authenticator, which relays authentication toward a RADIUS server. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Set an explicit supported fallback policy and test a simulated RADIUS timeout.

B:

A RADIUS Access-Reject event is distinct from a silent client and can be mapped to an appropriate reject VLAN. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: server fail fallback controls permit, deny, cached access or restricted VLAN assignment when authentication infrastructure is unavailable.

D:

MAC RADIUS can authenticate eligible non-802.1X endpoints using MAC-based identity against approved RADIUS policy. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A RADIUS server outage causes all access switches to block critical devices with no approved fallback behavior. Critical permitted endpoints need a documented authentication fallback.

Question 696

At a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A multicast security policy permits only approved publishers but receivers can still discover an unauthorized source. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization. Which underlying distinction should guide troubleshooting?

  1. Anycast RP permits multiple rendezvous points to share one RP address with routing choosing a reachable instance.
  2. Source-specific multicast uses explicit (S,G) interests and does not require an ASM rendezvous point.
  3. (S,G) multicast state identifies one particular source S and destination group G.
  4. PIM and multicast routing policy can be applied to limit permitted source and group reachability.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, the governing mechanism is: PIM and multicast routing policy can be applied to limit permitted source and group reachability. It explains the reported symptom: A multicast security policy permits only approved publishers but receivers can still discover an unauthorized source. The intended response is: Match and reject the prohibited source-group combinations with a suitable Junos multicast policy. Verification: Approved stream sources deliver while unauthorized source traffic does not build usable state.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Anycast RP permits multiple rendezvous points to share one RP address with routing choosing a reachable instance. This alternative mechanism does not match the current fault.

B:

Source-specific multicast uses explicit (S,G) interests and does not require an ASM rendezvous point. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: PIM and multicast routing policy can be applied to limit permitted source and group reachability.

C:

(S,G) multicast state identifies one particular source S and destination group G. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A multicast security policy permits only approved publishers but receivers can still discover an unauthorized source. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization.

Question 697

At a regional provider operating Junos-based branch routers, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Two routers on a dedicated Ethernet link are unexpectedly participating in broadcast-network DR election. The team must validate neighbor state rather than assume basic IP reachability proves routing. Which observation proves this requirement has been satisfied?

  1. The link operates with the intended point-to-point adjacency without DR election.
  2. The peer appears in show ospf neighbor and the local interface appears in show ospf interface.
  3. The intended external LSA appears only after the correct export policy is active.
  4. Trace messages show the relevant neighbor-state transition and correction removes the repeat failure.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For a regional provider operating Junos-based branch routers, the decisive evidence is: The link operates with the intended point-to-point adjacency without DR election. This validates the action: Configure a supported OSPF point-to-point network type consistently on the dedicated link. Because: OSPF interface network type influences neighbor formation and whether DR and BDR election is used. An unrelated successful test would not prove this specific issue is resolved.

Incorrect Answers

B:

OSPF neighbor discovery requires the relevant logical interface to participate in the correct routing instance and area. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Configure a supported OSPF point-to-point network type consistently on the dedicated link.

C:

Junos OSPF export governs eligible external route origination while import filtering has different route-selection effects. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: OSPF interface network type influences neighbor formation and whether DR and BDR election is used.

D:

Junos routing traceoptions can record protocol events for focused diagnosis when enabled carefully. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Two routers on a dedicated Ethernet link are unexpectedly participating in broadcast-network DR election. The team must validate neighbor state rather than assume basic IP reachability proves routing.

Question 698

At a financial services network enforcing trusted DSCP markings, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Engineers change a DSCP rewrite rule expecting packets to move into a different local output queue. Classification and downstream remarking must not be confused. Which operational result would most clearly confirm the fix?

  1. Interface queue statistics reflect the configured scheduler allocation under test.
  2. Queue counters show the intended internal class and egress capture shows appropriate markings.
  3. A capture and queue counters show tagged priority values mapped to the expected classes.
  4. Queue statistics show traffic entering different forwarding classes during a congestion test.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For a financial services network enforcing trusted DSCP markings, the decisive evidence is: Queue counters show the intended internal class and egress capture shows appropriate markings. This validates the action: Fix the relevant ingress classifier or multifield policy rather than only rewriting outgoing DSCP. Because: Classification determines internal forwarding class while rewrite rules modify markings on outgoing packets. An unrelated successful test would not prove this specific issue is resolved.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A scheduler map must be associated with the appropriate interface for selected class-to-scheduler behavior. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Fix the relevant ingress classifier or multifield policy rather than only rewriting outgoing DSCP.

C:

IEEE 802.1p priority values in tagged Ethernet frames can drive behavior aggregate Layer 2 CoS classification. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: classification determines internal forwarding class while rewrite rules modify markings on outgoing packets.

D:

Junos Class of Service uses forwarding classes to group packets for selected queuing and scheduling behavior. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Engineers change a DSCP rewrite rule expecting packets to move into a different local output queue. Classification and downstream remarking must not be confused.

Question 699

At a campus switch team configuring Junos egress queues, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: An enterprise shapes a WAN uplink but class scheduling behaves unpredictably within the aggregate cap. The improvement must not starve business traffic. What risk must the implementation avoid?

  1. Review fragment behavior and protocol matches before relying on broad address-only conditions.
  2. Account for added buffer delay and do not overshape real-time voice streams.
  3. Confirm platform feature support and monitor shaping delays for latency-sensitive traffic.
  4. Verify the actual output interface and aggregate hierarchy rather than binding a map to the wrong unit.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For a campus switch team configuring Junos egress queues, the relevant safeguard is: Confirm platform feature support and monitor shaping delays for latency-sensitive traffic. It matters while implementing: Configure the supported shaper and subordinate scheduler policy according to the actual forwarding hierarchy. The fault involves: Hierarchical CoS policies coordinate parent traffic shaping with child class queues or scheduler allocation where supported. The required acceptance result remains: Aggregate throughput stays under the circuit limit while class queues meet their intended bandwidth shares.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A multifield firewall filter can classify selected packets using header fields and set an appropriate forwarding class. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Confirm platform feature support and monitor shaping delays for latency-sensitive traffic.

B:

Shaping buffers excess eligible traffic to pace transmission whereas policing marks or drops traffic that exceeds a limit. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: Hierarchical CoS policies coordinate parent traffic shaping with child class queues or scheduler allocation where supported.

D:

A scheduler map must be associated with the appropriate interface for selected class-to-scheduler behavior. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: An enterprise shapes a WAN uplink but class scheduling behaves unpredictably within the aggregate cap. The improvement must not starve business traffic.

Question 700

At a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Multicast packets never cross an inter-router link and no PIM adjacency appears although IP unicast works. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization. Which observation proves this requirement has been satisfied?

  1. Only joined receiver ports receive the test multicast frames during stable operation.
  2. The RP learns the source and joined downstream receivers begin receiving the stream.
  3. Approved stream sources deliver while unauthorized source traffic does not build usable state.
  4. show pim neighbors lists the expected adjacent router on the planned interface.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, the decisive evidence is: show pim neighbors lists the expected adjacent router on the planned interface. This validates the action: Enable compatible PIM on the appropriate routed interfaces and allow required multicast control traffic. Because: PIM routers discover routing neighbors on participating interfaces through PIM Hello exchanges. An unrelated successful test would not prove this specific issue is resolved.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IGMP snooping lets a Layer 2 switch learn interested receiver ports and limit multicast flooding within a VLAN. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Enable compatible PIM on the appropriate routed interfaces and allow required multicast control traffic.

B:

In PIM sparse-mode ASM, a first-hop designated router can register new source traffic with the RP. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: PIM routers discover routing neighbors on participating interfaces through PIM Hello exchanges.

C:

PIM and multicast routing policy can be applied to limit permitted source and group reachability. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Multicast packets never cross an inter-router link and no PIM adjacency appears although IP unicast works. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization.

Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests