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Exam Code: JN0-650

Exam Name: Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT)

Certification Provider: Juniper

Corresponding Certification: JNCIP-ENT

Juniper JN0-650 Questions & Answers

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Juniper JN0-650 Practice Test 12

Question 110

At a financial services network enforcing trusted DSCP markings, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A downstream user workstation marks backup traffic as high priority and competes with voice in the protected queue. Classification and downstream remarking must not be confused. What protocol behavior accounts for this failure?

  1. Shaping buffers excess eligible traffic to pace transmission whereas policing marks or drops traffic that exceeds a limit.
  2. The ingress trust boundary decides whether external markings should be accepted or reclassified.
  3. Junos rewrite rules map internal forwarding class and loss-priority information to outgoing packet codepoints.
  4. Hierarchical CoS policies coordinate parent traffic shaping with child class queues or scheduler allocation where supported.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For a financial services network enforcing trusted DSCP markings, the governing mechanism is: The ingress trust boundary decides whether external markings should be accepted or reclassified. It explains the reported symptom: A downstream user workstation marks backup traffic as high priority and competes with voice in the protected queue. The intended response is: Apply a controlled classifier or policer for untrusted ports while trusting only authorized phone or uplink markings. Verification: The workstation's spoofed expedited marking is reset and voice retains the intended priority.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Shaping buffers excess eligible traffic to pace transmission whereas policing marks or drops traffic that exceeds a limit. This alternative mechanism does not match the current fault.

C:

Junos rewrite rules map internal forwarding class and loss-priority information to outgoing packet codepoints. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: the ingress trust boundary decides whether external markings should be accepted or reclassified.

D:

Hierarchical CoS policies coordinate parent traffic shaping with child class queues or scheduler allocation where supported. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A downstream user workstation marks backup traffic as high priority and competes with voice in the protected queue. Classification and downstream remarking must not be confused.

Question 111

At a live-event venue using routed multicast streaming, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Separate PIM-SM rendezvous points cannot discover active multicast sources registered at neighboring RPs. The change must preserve source identity and avoid multicast loops. For which use case is this feature the best match?

  1. Use source-group entries to trace a single multicast sender's path.
  2. Use PIM sparse mode for receiver-driven multicast path construction.
  3. Use MSDP where RP source discovery must span compatible ASM domains.
  4. Use IPv4 multicast addressing when a sender must distribute the same traffic to many receivers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For a live-event venue using routed multicast streaming, this mechanism fits the requirement: Use MSDP where RP source discovery must span compatible ASM domains. The design is appropriate because: Multicast Source Discovery Protocol communicates source-active information between supported RPs. In this scenario, the observed issue is: Separate PIM-SM rendezvous points cannot discover active multicast sources registered at neighboring RPs. The corresponding implementation is: Configure the required MSDP relationships between the intended ASM rendezvous points.

Incorrect Answers

A:

(S,G) multicast state identifies one particular source S and destination group G. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Configure the required MSDP relationships between the intended ASM rendezvous points.

B:

PIM sparse mode builds multicast forwarding paths in response to explicit joins rather than flooding everywhere. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: Multicast Source Discovery Protocol communicates source-active information between supported RPs.

D:

IPv4 multicast traffic uses group addresses from 224.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255 rather than ordinary unicast host destinations. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Separate PIM-SM rendezvous points cannot discover active multicast sources registered at neighboring RPs. The change must preserve source identity and avoid multicast loops.

Question 112

At a corporate campus enforcing wired network access, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A guest must accept access conditions in a browser before reaching a limited public LAN. Unknown endpoints must not gain access to protected internal VLANs. What is the most likely design-related cause?

  1. Server fail fallback controls permit, deny, cached access or restricted VLAN assignment when authentication infrastructure is unavailable.
  2. A RADIUS Access-Reject event is distinct from a silent client and can be mapped to an appropriate reject VLAN.
  3. 802.1X uses a supplicant, switch authenticator and authentication server to validate identity before controlled port access.
  4. Captive portal authentication can redirect eligible unauthenticated traffic to an approved web-based onboarding flow.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For a corporate campus enforcing wired network access, the governing mechanism is: Captive portal authentication can redirect eligible unauthenticated traffic to an approved web-based onboarding flow. It explains the reported symptom: A guest must accept access conditions in a browser before reaching a limited public LAN. The intended response is: Configure supported captive-portal access and browser redirection with suitable authentication infrastructure. Verification: The guest sees the authorized portal and only obtains permitted access after the expected process.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Server fail fallback controls permit, deny, cached access or restricted VLAN assignment when authentication infrastructure is unavailable. This alternative mechanism does not match the current fault.

B:

A RADIUS Access-Reject event is distinct from a silent client and can be mapped to an appropriate reject VLAN. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: captive portal authentication can redirect eligible unauthenticated traffic to an approved web-based onboarding flow.

C:

802.1X uses a supplicant, switch authenticator and authentication server to validate identity before controlled port access. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A guest must accept access conditions in a browser before reaching a limited public LAN. Unknown endpoints must not gain access to protected internal VLANs.

Question 113

At a campus network built with Juniper EX switches, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Two application hosts should communicate with each other but remain isolated from other tenant communities on the same primary VLAN. The intended segmentation and loop prevention must remain intact. What would demonstrate a successful correction under test?

  1. Hosts in the same community communicate and cross-community test frames are blocked.
  2. Two isolated test devices cannot communicate directly but each can reach the authorized gateway.
  3. Maximum expected tagged frames traverse every provider hop without oversize drops.
  4. Both participating switches learn the correct registered VLAN and forward its traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For a campus network built with Juniper EX switches, the decisive evidence is: Hosts in the same community communicate and cross-community test frames are blocked. This validates the action: Create the intended community membership and permitted promiscuous gateway association. Because: Private VLAN community ports support intra-community traffic while preventing communication with other communities. An unrelated successful test would not prove this specific issue is resolved.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Private VLAN isolated ports restrict communication with peer isolated ports while allowing designated promiscuous connectivity. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Create the intended community membership and permitted promiscuous gateway association.

C:

Adding an outer VLAN tag increases Ethernet frame size and may exceed an interface's supported MTU. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: private VLAN community ports support intra-community traffic while preventing communication with other communities.

D:

Multiple VLAN Registration Protocol exchanges VLAN registration information between participating bridged devices. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Two application hosts should communicate with each other but remain isolated from other tenant communities on the same primary VLAN. The intended segmentation and loop prevention must remain intact.

Question 114

At a regional provider operating Junos-based branch routers, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Two routers on a dedicated Ethernet link are unexpectedly participating in broadcast-network DR election. The team must validate neighbor state rather than assume basic IP reachability proves routing. Which configuration adjustment should be made first to address this issue?

  1. Enable OSPF on the intended logical interface under the appropriate area and confirm its interface parameters.
  2. Configure a supported OSPF point-to-point network type consistently on the dedicated link.
  3. Choose the intended external metric type for the redistributed prefix and validate path selection.
  4. Export only the authorized default route and confirm its next-hop and forwarding path.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For a regional provider operating Junos-based branch routers, the direct corrective action is: Configure a supported OSPF point-to-point network type consistently on the dedicated link. This addresses the mechanism: OSPF interface network type influences neighbor formation and whether DR and BDR election is used. Confirm by checking: The link operates with the intended point-to-point adjacency without DR election. During rollout, verify both ends and vendor interoperability before changing interface type.

Incorrect Answers

A:

OSPF neighbor discovery requires the relevant logical interface to participate in the correct routing instance and area. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Configure a supported OSPF point-to-point network type consistently on the dedicated link.

C:

Type-1 external OSPF cost includes internal cost to the ASBR while type-2 primarily uses the external metric for selection. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: OSPF interface network type influences neighbor formation and whether DR and BDR election is used.

D:

A scoped OSPF default-route export can advertise 0.0.0.0/0 when the default is valid. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Two routers on a dedicated Ethernet link are unexpectedly participating in broadcast-network DR election. The team must validate neighbor state rather than assume basic IP reachability proves routing.

Question 115

At a managed network team troubleshooting an internet edge, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A BGP neighbor uses an AS number above the two-byte range but older configuration assumes a 16-bit value. The diagnosis must distinguish a healthy BGP session from eligible received routes. Which design objective is best served by this mechanism?

  1. Use selective damping when repeated instability warrants controlled suppression.
  2. Use next-hop resolution to determine BGP route eligibility for active forwarding.
  3. Use four-octet AS number support when peering with modern high-numbered ASes.
  4. Use route-filter match semantics to prevent unintended more-specific route leaks.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For a managed network team troubleshooting an internet edge, this mechanism fits the requirement: Use four-octet AS number support when peering with modern high-numbered ASes. The design is appropriate because: BGP supports 4-octet autonomous system numbering through compatible capabilities and AS processing. In this scenario, the observed issue is: A BGP neighbor uses an AS number above the two-byte range but older configuration assumes a 16-bit value. The corresponding implementation is: Configure the correct complete AS value on both peers using supported BGP capability negotiation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Route-flap damping can suppress repeatedly changing paths according to configured penalties and reuse rules. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Configure the correct complete AS value on both peers using supported BGP capability negotiation.

B:

A usable BGP route requires an eligible reachable forwarding next hop before it can become active. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: BGP supports 4-octet autonomous system numbering through compatible capabilities and AS processing.

D:

Junos route filters distinguish exact matching from longer or longer-prefix patterns. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A BGP neighbor uses an AS number above the two-byte range but older configuration assumes a 16-bit value. The diagnosis must distinguish a healthy BGP session from eligible received routes.

Question 116

At a national enterprise designing OSPF between offices, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: An ABR leaks a sensitive or unwanted interarea prefix despite intended area filtering. The internal forwarding path must remain stable when one uplink fails. Which precaution should be checked before committing the change?

  1. Check address families and filtering carefully to avoid importing every static IPv6 route.
  2. Do not hide an actual failing link solely by increasing timers.
  3. Avoid flipping E1 and E2 globally without analyzing alternate egress paths.
  4. Distinguish topology LSAs from summary policy to avoid accidental intra-area isolation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For a national enterprise designing OSPF between offices, the relevant safeguard is: Distinguish topology LSAs from summary policy to avoid accidental intra-area isolation. It matters while implementing: Apply a targeted interarea summarization or route-control policy at the correct OSPF hierarchy. The fault involves: OSPF interarea summary-LSA generation can be governed with supported routing policies on ABRs. The required acceptance result remains: show ospf database and downstream routes reflect only the approved summaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Junos requires a suitable route export policy to originate eligible non-OSPFv3 routes. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Distinguish topology LSAs from summary policy to avoid accidental intra-area isolation.

B:

Link-state SPF recalculation is triggered by topology changes and must converge over a coherent LSDB. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: OSPF interarea summary-LSA generation can be governed with supported routing policies on ABRs.

C:

Type-1 external OSPF cost includes internal cost to the ASBR while type-2 primarily uses the external metric for selection. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: An ABR leaks a sensitive or unwanted interarea prefix despite intended area filtering. The internal forwarding path must remain stable when one uplink fails.

Question 117

At a managed office network with printers and laptops, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A legacy network printer cannot run an 802.1X supplicant and never receives permitted LAN access. The switch must distinguish identity failures from absent authentication responses. Which limitation should guide the change control?

  1. Treat MAC addresses as spoofable and pair this method with restrictive network segmentation.
  2. Test device and Junos release support before assuming every simultaneous combination is available.
  3. Do not confuse a server timeout with an explicit Access-Reject or permit a broad uncontrolled bypass.
  4. Preserve break-glass and management paths when enabling access control on an active switch.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

For a managed office network with printers and laptops, the relevant safeguard is: Treat MAC addresses as spoofable and pair this method with restrictive network segmentation. It matters while implementing: Enable MAC RADIUS as an approved method for the printer port and register the permitted device identity. The fault involves: MAC RADIUS can authenticate eligible non-802.1X endpoints using MAC-based identity against approved RADIUS policy. The required acceptance result remains: The intended printer gains restricted access while an unrecognized MAC does not inherit privileged resources.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Multiple authentication methods can have defined precedence and permitted fallback behavior depending on endpoint response. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Treat MAC addresses as spoofable and pair this method with restrictive network segmentation.

C:

Server fail fallback controls permit, deny, cached access or restricted VLAN assignment when authentication infrastructure is unavailable. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: MAC RADIUS can authenticate eligible non-802.1X endpoints using MAC-based identity against approved RADIUS policy.

D:

802.1X uses a supplicant, switch authenticator and authentication server to validate identity before controlled port access. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A legacy network printer cannot run an 802.1X supplicant and never receives permitted LAN access. The switch must distinguish identity failures from absent authentication responses.

Question 118

At a data-center access fabric using tagged trunks, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: Several tenant endpoints must reach a gateway but must not exchange Layer 2 traffic with each other. The proposed behavior must be validated on actual switching ports. When would the described mechanism be appropriate?

  1. Use MSTP to preserve redundancy without Layer 2 forwarding loops.
  2. Use private VLAN isolated ports for same-subnet tenant isolation.
  3. Use private VLAN communities for grouped same-subnet connectivity.
  4. Use access VLAN assignment for a single untagged user segment.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

For a data-center access fabric using tagged trunks, this mechanism fits the requirement: Use private VLAN isolated ports for same-subnet tenant isolation. The design is appropriate because: Private VLAN isolated ports restrict communication with peer isolated ports while allowing designated promiscuous connectivity. In this scenario, the observed issue is: Several tenant endpoints must reach a gateway but must not exchange Layer 2 traffic with each other. The corresponding implementation is: Map the isolated ports to the private VLAN design and configure the approved gateway-facing port.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Spanning tree prevents bridging loops by keeping appropriate redundant ports in nondesignated states. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Map the isolated ports to the private VLAN design and configure the approved gateway-facing port.

C:

Private VLAN community ports support intra-community traffic while preventing communication with other communities. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: private VLAN isolated ports restrict communication with peer isolated ports while allowing designated promiscuous connectivity.

D:

An untagged Ethernet access port places endpoint traffic into its configured access VLAN. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: Several tenant endpoints must reach a gateway but must not exchange Layer 2 traffic with each other. The proposed behavior must be validated on actual switching ports. When would the described mechanism be appropriate.

Question 119

At a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: A campus multicast application leaks into an intersite link where the traffic is not permitted. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization. What is the most likely design-related cause?

  1. PIM Join and Prune signaling maintains or removes forwarding-tree state as downstream interest changes.
  2. IPv4 multicast traffic uses group addresses from 224.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255 rather than ordinary unicast host destinations.
  3. Multicast group and routing policies can limit which group ranges and sources cross specified boundaries.
  4. IGMP snooping lets a Layer 2 switch learn interested receiver ports and limit multicast flooding within a VLAN.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

For a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, the governing mechanism is: Multicast group and routing policies can limit which group ranges and sources cross specified boundaries. It explains the reported symptom: A campus multicast application leaks into an intersite link where the traffic is not permitted. The intended response is: Apply explicit multicast scope or PIM routing policy at the relevant domain boundary. Verification: An allowed test group crosses the boundary while a restricted group does not.

Incorrect Answers

A:

PIM Join and Prune signaling maintains or removes forwarding-tree state as downstream interest changes. This alternative mechanism does not match the current fault.

B:

IPv4 multicast traffic uses group addresses from 224.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255 rather than ordinary unicast host destinations. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: multicast group and routing policies can limit which group ranges and sources cross specified boundaries.

D:

IGMP snooping lets a Layer 2 switch learn interested receiver ports and limit multicast flooding within a VLAN. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: A campus multicast application leaks into an intersite link where the traffic is not permitted. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization.

Question 120

At a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, a Junos specialist investigates this scenario: An enterprise deploys IPv6 group delivery but attempts to identify receivers with ordinary IPv6 unicast addresses. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization. When would the described mechanism be appropriate?

  1. Use IPv4 multicast addressing when a sender must distribute the same traffic to many receivers.
  2. Use a consistent RP mapping to support any-source multicast group discovery.
  3. Use (*,G) state when receiving any-source multicast through a shared tree.
  4. Use scoped IPv6 multicast addresses for one-to-many IPv6 applications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

For a multimedia training network running Junos multicast routers, this mechanism fits the requirement: Use scoped IPv6 multicast addresses for one-to-many IPv6 applications. The design is appropriate because: IPv6 multicast destinations begin in the FF00::/8 range and include scope information. In this scenario, the observed issue is: An enterprise deploys IPv6 group delivery but attempts to identify receivers with ordinary IPv6 unicast addresses. The corresponding implementation is: Select a suitable IPv6 multicast group and scope for the approved application.

Incorrect Answers

A:

IPv4 multicast traffic uses group addresses from 224.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255 rather than ordinary unicast host destinations. The appropriate correction for the reported case is: Select a suitable IPv6 multicast group and scope for the approved application.

B:

PIM-SM shared-tree construction depends on consistent mappings of multicast groups to suitable RPs. Fixing that different mechanism would not address the current root cause: IPv6 multicast destinations begin in the FF00::/8 range and include scope information.

C:

Shared-tree (*,G) state expresses interest in traffic to group G from potentially multiple sources. Its verification is distinct from the reported condition: An enterprise deploys IPv6 group delivery but attempts to identify receivers with ordinary IPv6 unicast addresses. The corrected tree must respect source and group authorization. When would the described mechanism be appropriate.

Enterprise Routing and Switching, Professional (JNCIP-ENT) (JN0-650) Practice Tests