Question 410
A Linux administrator evaluates: A security review needs to document who holds recovery keys before deploying encrypted volumes across branch offices. Select TWO complementary answers: the most suitable corrective action AND the evidence proving it worked.
Explanation
Correct Answers
For the specific observation (A security review needs to document who holds recovery keys before deploying encrypted volumes across branch offices), the acceptance evidence is: cryptsetup status and an authorized unlock/restore rehearsal confirm that data is encrypted at rest and recoverable. This verifies the action (Use supported LUKS2 volume encryption with approved passphrase or key management and practice recovery before storing sensitive data.) rather than merely proving that an unrelated Linux tool works. It also addresses the known risk: A volume encrypted without safely recoverable key material can remain permanently inaccessible after host loss.
The observed Linux condition is: A security review needs to document who holds recovery keys before deploying encrypted volumes across branch offices. The recommended direct administrative response is: Use supported LUKS2 volume encryption with approved passphrase or key management and practice recovery before storing sensitive data. The relevant failure or security risk is: A volume encrypted without safely recoverable key material can remain permanently inaccessible after host loss. Validate success with: cryptsetup status and an authorized unlock/restore rehearsal confirm that data is encrypted at rest and recoverable.
Incorrect Answers
Baseline compliance scanning with OpenSCAP (3.6) would demonstrate or implement: A repeat scan records reviewed findings, documented exceptions and improvements without breaking approved service checks. The case states: the most suitable corrective action AND the evidence proving it worked. The most direct paired action and test is: cryptsetup status and an authorized unlock/restore rehearsal confirm that data is encrypted at rest and recoverable.
File ACL permissions and secure umask defaults (3.3) would demonstrate or implement: World-writable permissions and overly permissive default ACLs can expose secrets to other local users. This choice can be useful for that problem, but it does not establish the LUKS2 full-volume encryption and key recovery control being assessed here.
Linux audit trails with auditd and journalctl (3.1) addresses another technical failure: An uncollected privileged action or volatile journal cannot provide reliable post-incident accountability evidence. The paired-answer requirement concerns LUKS2 full-volume encryption and key recovery; this alternative does not provide the matching intervention and separate acceptance evidence.