Question 420
A Linux administrator evaluates: A certificate renewal is complete but the daemon still serves the previous expired key pair until reload. Select TWO complementary answers: the most suitable corrective action AND the evidence proving it worked.
Explanation
Correct Answers
The observed Linux condition is: A certificate renewal is complete but the daemon still serves the previous expired key pair until reload. The recommended direct administrative response is: Use supported OpenSSL and client tools to check certificate validity, hostname and trusted issuer chain before accepting secure connections. The relevant failure or security risk is: Ignoring expired or mismatched certificates can conceal server impersonation or cause applications to fail TLS negotiation. Validate success with: An approved client validates the intended hostname and certificate chain, and a deliberately untrusted endpoint is rejected.
For the specific observation (A certificate renewal is complete but the daemon still serves the previous expired key pair until reload), the acceptance evidence is: An approved client validates the intended hostname and certificate chain, and a deliberately untrusted endpoint is rejected. This verifies the action (Use supported OpenSSL and client tools to check certificate validity, hostname and trusted issuer chain before accepting secure connections.) rather than merely proving that an unrelated Linux tool works. It also addresses the known risk: Ignoring expired or mismatched certificates can conceal server impersonation or cause applications to fail TLS negotiation.
Incorrect Answers
Password aging and inactive account enforcement (3.4) addresses another technical failure: Accounts that never expire or continue authenticating after offboarding create persistent unauthorized access risk. The case states: A certificate renewal is complete but the daemon still serves the previous expired key pair until reload. The most direct paired action and test is: Use supported OpenSSL and client tools to check certificate validity, hostname and trusted issuer chain before accepting secure connections.
SELinux context and boolean troubleshooting (3.3) would demonstrate or implement: The service works with SELinux enforcing and its resources have persistent expected contexts without repeated AVC denials. This choice can be useful for that problem, but it does not establish the TLS certificate and trust-chain validation control being assessed here.
MFA and restricted service identity practices (3.4) would demonstrate or implement: Shared interactive service credentials or an MFA bypass for privileged sessions weakens identity assurance and incident attribution. The required paired action and test concerns TLS certificate and trust-chain validation; a passing result for this alternative could leave that requirement unresolved.