Question 390
A Linux administrator evaluates: An administrator confuses password expiry with whole-account expiry and must verify both settings. Select TWO complementary answers: the most suitable corrective action AND the evidence proving it worked.
Explanation
Correct Answers
For the specific observation (An administrator confuses password expiry with whole-account expiry and must verify both settings), the acceptance evidence is: chage -l and controlled authentication tests confirm the intended max-age, expiration and lockout behavior. This verifies the action (Review and enforce supported local password aging, account expiry and lock status with chage, passwd and policy-appropriate PAM controls.) rather than merely proving that an unrelated Linux tool works. It also addresses the known risk: Accounts that never expire or continue authenticating after offboarding create persistent unauthorized access risk.
The observed Linux condition is: An administrator confuses password expiry with whole-account expiry and must verify both settings. The recommended direct administrative response is: Review and enforce supported local password aging, account expiry and lock status with chage, passwd and policy-appropriate PAM controls. The relevant failure or security risk is: Accounts that never expire or continue authenticating after offboarding create persistent unauthorized access risk. Validate success with: chage -l and controlled authentication tests confirm the intended max-age, expiration and lockout behavior.
Incorrect Answers
OpenSSH server key authentication and root login hardening (3.3) addresses another technical failure: Disabling all authentication methods before testing keys can lock out administrators, while root password login enlarges exposure. The case states: the most suitable corrective action AND the evidence proving it worked. The most direct paired action and test is: chage -l and controlled authentication tests confirm the intended max-age, expiration and lockout behavior.
LUKS2 full-volume encryption and key recovery (3.5) would demonstrate or implement: A volume encrypted without safely recoverable key material can remain permanently inaccessible after host loss. This case instead tests Password aging and inactive account enforcement; the choice measures or changes another part of the system.
File ACL permissions and secure umask defaults (3.3) would demonstrate or implement: getfacl and controlled read/write tests show approved users can work and unrelated users are denied. The paired-answer requirement concerns Password aging and inactive account enforcement; this alternative does not provide the matching intervention and separate acceptance evidence.