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Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 43

Question 420

A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.
  2. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.
  3. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval.
  4. Action: Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification. Verification: Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment Test against inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

C:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Action: Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification. Verification: Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 421

A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. Best next IAM response?

  1. Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins
  2. Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration
  3. Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification
  4. Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration Test against inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

C:

“Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 422

A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. Most decisive verification?

  1. Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion
  2. Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent
  3. Check signing key fingerprint, metadata published to partners, trust-update status and login smoke tests
  4. Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration It checks whether fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion” needs to be evaluated against A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

B:

“Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent” needs to be evaluated against A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

C:

“Check signing key fingerprint, metadata published to partners, trust-update status and login smoke tests” needs to be evaluated against A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 423

A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. Key caution for this case?

  1. OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls
  2. Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval
  3. Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk
  4. Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” needs to be evaluated against A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls” needs to be evaluated against A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

B:

“Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval” needs to be evaluated against A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” needs to be evaluated against A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 424

A web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.
  2. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval.
  3. Action: Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification. Verification: Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.
  4. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration Test against inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

C:

“Action: Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification. Verification: Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a web authentication callback unexpectedly changes hostname after a My Domain migration The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 425

A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. Best next IAM response?

  1. Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate
  2. Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification
  3. Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling
  4. Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user Test against review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; the existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

B:

“Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

C:

“Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Question 426

A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. Most decisive verification?

  1. Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs
  2. Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent
  3. Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests
  4. Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user It checks whether use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs” needs to be evaluated against A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

B:

“Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent” needs to be evaluated against A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

D:

“Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime” needs to be evaluated against A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Question 427

A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. Key caution for this case?

  1. The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements
  2. Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval
  3. A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry
  4. Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements” needs to be evaluated against A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval” needs to be evaluated against A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

C:

“A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” needs to be evaluated against A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

D:

“Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” needs to be evaluated against A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Question 428

A business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval.
  2. Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.
  3. Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.
  4. Action: Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user Test against review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; the existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

C:

“Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

D:

“Action: Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a business asks a service app to read customer records and proposes a global system administrator integration user The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Question 429

A partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions. Best next IAM response?

  1. Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate
  2. Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification
  3. Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling
  4. Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions Test against review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; the existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

B:

“Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

C:

“Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests for a partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions The controlling boundary is: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Question 430

A partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions. Most decisive verification?

  1. Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime
  2. Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests
  3. Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent
  4. Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions It checks whether use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime” needs to be evaluated against A partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

C:

“Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent” needs to be evaluated against A partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

D:

“Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs” needs to be evaluated against A partner service must query selected object fields but requests unrestricted token scopes and profile permissions. The relevant check is Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests; The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests