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Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 42

Question 410

A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. Most decisive verification?

  1. Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance
  2. Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments
  3. Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests
  4. Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide It checks whether plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance” needs to be evaluated against A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

B:

“Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments” needs to be evaluated against A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

C:

“Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests” needs to be evaluated against A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Question 411

A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. Key caution for this case?

  1. Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working
  2. Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration
  3. A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry
  4. IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” needs to be evaluated against A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” needs to be evaluated against A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

C:

“A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” needs to be evaluated against A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

D:

“IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” needs to be evaluated against A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Question 412

A developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.
  2. Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.
  3. Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.
  4. Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide Test against check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

B:

“Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

D:

“Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a developer begins a brand-new Salesforce OAuth integration using connected app creation instructions from an outdated exam guide The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Question 413

A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. Best next IAM response?

  1. Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers
  2. Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported
  3. Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed
  4. Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org Test against check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

B:

“Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

D:

“Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Question 414

A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. Most decisive verification?

  1. Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests
  2. Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance
  3. Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments
  4. Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org It checks whether plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests” needs to be evaluated against A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

B:

“Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance” needs to be evaluated against A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

C:

“Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments” needs to be evaluated against A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Question 415

A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. Key caution for this case?

  1. Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working
  2. A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry
  3. Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration
  4. IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” needs to be evaluated against A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” needs to be evaluated against A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

C:

“Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” needs to be evaluated against A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

D:

“IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” needs to be evaluated against A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. The relevant check is Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Question 416

A consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.
  2. Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.
  3. Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.
  4. Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org Test against check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls; restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Action: Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

C:

“Action: Use a dedicated least-privileged app execution identity and restrict access at OAuth, object, field and record layers. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

D:

“Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls for a consulting team can maintain existing connected apps but cannot create another by default in its Spring 2026 org The controlling boundary is: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Question 417

A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. Best next IAM response?

  1. Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks
  2. Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration
  3. Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins
  4. Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment Test against inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

B:

“Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 418

A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. Most decisive verification?

  1. Check signing key fingerprint, metadata published to partners, trust-update status and login smoke tests
  2. Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent
  3. Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs
  4. Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment It checks whether fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Check signing key fingerprint, metadata published to partners, trust-update status and login smoke tests” needs to be evaluated against A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

B:

“Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent” needs to be evaluated against A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion” needs to be evaluated against A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 419

A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. Key caution for this case?

  1. Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval
  2. OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls
  3. Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk
  4. Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” needs to be evaluated against A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval” needs to be evaluated against A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

B:

“OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls” needs to be evaluated against A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” needs to be evaluated against A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. The relevant check is Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Question 420

A mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.
  2. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.
  3. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval.
  4. Action: Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification. Verification: Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment Test against inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs; loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

C:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: Device authorization is not a shortcut for unattended server access or bypassing user approval” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

D:

“Action: Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification. Verification: Compare service provider metadata, Salesforce app configuration, subject claims and signed assertion. Boundary: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs for a mobile OAuth client fails after deployment because its redirect URI omits an expected path segment The controlling boundary is: Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests