Question 380
A relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity. Best complete IAM decision record?
Explanation
Correct Answer
“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity Test against validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; a correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.
Incorrect Answers
“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.
“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: Rotating a signing certificate without coordinating trust at the SP can interrupt every affected sign-in” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.
“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.