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Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 39

Question 380

A relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.
  2. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.
  3. Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: Rotating a signing certificate without coordinating trust at the SP can interrupt every affected sign-in.
  4. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity Test against validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; a correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

C:

“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: Rotating a signing certificate without coordinating trust at the SP can interrupt every affected sign-in” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

D:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a relying party uses an OAuth access token as evidence of a user's birthdate and email identity The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Question 381

A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. Best next IAM response?

  1. Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins
  2. Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks
  3. Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate
  4. Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce Test against validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; a correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

C:

“Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

D:

“Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Question 382

A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. Most decisive verification?

  1. Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling
  2. Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange
  3. Check signing key fingerprint, metadata published to partners, trust-update status and login smoke tests
  4. Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce It checks whether separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling” needs to be evaluated against A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. The relevant check is Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

B:

“Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange” needs to be evaluated against A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. The relevant check is Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

C:

“Check signing key fingerprint, metadata published to partners, trust-update status and login smoke tests” needs to be evaluated against A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. The relevant check is Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Question 383

A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. Key caution for this case?

  1. A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party
  2. Rotating a signing certificate without coordinating trust at the SP can interrupt every affected sign-in
  3. Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working
  4. An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” needs to be evaluated against A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. The relevant check is Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Rotating a signing certificate without coordinating trust at the SP can interrupt every affected sign-in” needs to be evaluated against A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. The relevant check is Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

C:

“Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” needs to be evaluated against A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. The relevant check is Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

D:

“An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” needs to be evaluated against A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. The relevant check is Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Question 384

A partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working.
  2. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.
  3. Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: Rotating a signing certificate without coordinating trust at the SP can interrupt every affected sign-in.
  4. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce Test against validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context; a correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: Restricting new connected app creation does not mean every existing connected app immediately stops working” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

C:

“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: Rotating a signing certificate without coordinating trust at the SP can interrupt every affected sign-in” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

D:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context for a partner checks an OIDC ID token but ignores its intended audience and nonce The controlling boundary is: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Question 385

An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. Best next IAM response?

  1. Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate
  2. Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior
  3. Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string
  4. Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling” addresses the access-design responsibilities in an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource Test against inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; idP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

B:

“Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

C:

“Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Question 386

An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. Most decisive verification?

  1. Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination
  2. Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior
  3. Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context
  4. Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource It checks whether configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior” needs to be evaluated against An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

C:

“Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context” needs to be evaluated against An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

D:

“Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent” needs to be evaluated against An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Question 387

An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. Key caution for this case?

  1. IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent
  2. New connected app creation is restricted as of Spring 2026; an old exam-guide click path may no longer apply
  3. An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party
  4. The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” needs to be evaluated against An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“New connected app creation is restricted as of Spring 2026; an old exam-guide click path may no longer apply” needs to be evaluated against An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

C:

“An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” needs to be evaluated against An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

D:

“The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements” needs to be evaluated against An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Question 388

An external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.
  2. Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.
  3. Action: Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling. Verification: Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior. Boundary: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements.
  4. Action: Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling. Verification: Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Action: Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling. Verification: Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” addresses the access-design responsibilities in an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource Test against inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; idP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior. Verification: Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

B:

“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

C:

“Action: Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling. Verification: Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior. Boundary: The existence of an API token is not a license to read records outside the principal's entitlements” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for an external service provider starts login by requesting authentication from Salesforce and expects to return to a resource The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Question 389

A staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool. Best next IAM response?

  1. Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior
  2. Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling
  3. Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string
  4. Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool Test against inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; idP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for a staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

C:

“Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for a staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

D:

“Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination for a staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool The controlling boundary is: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Question 390

A staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool. Most decisive verification?

  1. Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination
  2. Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent
  3. Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context
  4. Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool It checks whether configure both supported SAML initiation paths with correctly signed requests and restricted state handling.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent” needs to be evaluated against A staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

C:

“Validate token type, signature trust, issuer, subject, audience and replay context” needs to be evaluated against A staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

D:

“Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior” needs to be evaluated against A staff member opens the Salesforce App Launcher and starts an IdP-initiated session to a partner tool. The relevant check is Inspect AuthnRequest, RelayState, ACS result, session lifetime and redirect destination; IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests