mcAfee Secure Website
exam =5
exam =6

Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

Reliable & Actual Study Materials for Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Exam Success

58 Questions & Answers with Testing Engine

"Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect" Testing Engine covers all the knowledge points of the real Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect exam.

The latest actual Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers from Pass4sure. Everything you need to prepare and get best score at Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect exam easily and quickly.

exam =7
Guarantee

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Pass4sure has a remarkable Salesforce Candidate Success record. We're confident of our products and provide no hassle product exchange. That's how confident we are!

99.3% Pass Rate
Was: $137.49
Now: $124.99

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 37

Question 360

A vendor wants refresh privileges and administrative API access for a small one-time lookup. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Coordinate Salesforce IdP signing certificate rollover with service providers and preserve fallback verification. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.
  2. Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.
  3. Action: Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: A JWT's signature alone does not authorize any user or resource outside the registered app and org policy.
  4. Action: Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Action: Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a vendor wants refresh privileges and administrative API access for a small one-time lookup Test against test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions; oAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Coordinate Salesforce IdP signing certificate rollover with service providers and preserve fallback verification. Verification: Check Spring 2026 org restrictions, ECA policy, callback allowlists and credential controls. Boundary: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions for a vendor wants refresh privileges and administrative API access for a small one-time lookup The controlling boundary is: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.

B:

“Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions for a vendor wants refresh privileges and administrative API access for a small one-time lookup The controlling boundary is: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.

C:

“Action: Choose narrowly scoped OAuth grants and enforce least-privilege access independently of the OAuth scope string. Verification: Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs. Boundary: A JWT's signature alone does not authorize any user or resource outside the registered app and org policy” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions for a vendor wants refresh privileges and administrative API access for a small one-time lookup The controlling boundary is: OAuth scope alone does not override object-level and record-level Salesforce access controls.

Question 361

A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. Best next IAM response?

  1. Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported
  2. Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate
  3. Apply app access policies, understandable consent and administrative approval for sensitive integrations
  4. Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers Test against inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; a valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“Apply app access policies, understandable consent and administrative approval for sensitive integrations” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 362

A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. Most decisive verification?

  1. Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance
  2. Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime
  3. Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation
  4. Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers It checks whether protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime” needs to be evaluated against A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation” needs to be evaluated against A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange” needs to be evaluated against A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 363

A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. Key caution for this case?

  1. A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party
  2. A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry
  3. Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk
  4. Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” needs to be evaluated against A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” needs to be evaluated against A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” needs to be evaluated against A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” needs to be evaluated against A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 364

A service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.
  2. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.
  3. Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.
  4. Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers Test against inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; a valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a service application stores a refresh token in a shared log file accessible to developers The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 365

A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. Best next IAM response?

  1. Apply app access policies, understandable consent and administrative approval for sensitive integrations
  2. Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported
  3. Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins
  4. Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves Test against inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; a valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Apply app access policies, understandable consent and administrative approval for sensitive integrations” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 366

A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. Most decisive verification?

  1. Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime
  2. Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance
  3. Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange
  4. Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves It checks whether protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Review external client app settings, execution identity, object permissions and token lifetime” needs to be evaluated against A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange” needs to be evaluated against A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation” needs to be evaluated against A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 367

A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. Key caution for this case?

  1. A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry
  2. Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk
  3. A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party
  4. Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” needs to be evaluated against A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Loosening redirect URI restrictions to accept arbitrary targets creates token interception risk” needs to be evaluated against A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” needs to be evaluated against A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” needs to be evaluated against A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. The relevant check is Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 368

A connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.
  2. Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party.
  3. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.
  4. Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves Test against inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance; a valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Action: Protect refresh tokens, limit lifecycle, revoke compromised tokens and enforce rotation where supported. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: A correctly signed token intended for another client must not authenticate the local relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

C:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Verify signed assertion claims, token audience, issuer binding, scope and key rotation. Boundary: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

D:

“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish inspect token storage, revocation events, principal ownership and new token issuance for a connected partner integration keeps reusing long-lived tokens after an employee leaves The controlling boundary is: A valid refresh token can outlive the initiating sign-in and must not be treated as harmless telemetry.

Question 369

A third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted. Best next IAM response?

  1. Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed
  2. Apply app access policies, understandable consent and administrative approval for sensitive integrations
  3. Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification
  4. Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Apply app access policies, understandable consent and administrative approval for sensitive integrations” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted Test against review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior; an OAuth consent screen is not a substitute for enterprise security review or least-privilege configuration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Plan new OAuth integrations with the external client app framework and confirm exception procedures only when genuinely needed” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior for a third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted The controlling boundary is: An OAuth consent screen is not a substitute for enterprise security review or least-privilege configuration.

C:

“Consider a supported device authorization flow only for an appropriate constrained client with secure user verification” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior for a third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted The controlling boundary is: An OAuth consent screen is not a substitute for enterprise security review or least-privilege configuration.

D:

“Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior for a third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted The controlling boundary is: An OAuth consent screen is not a substitute for enterprise security review or least-privilege configuration.

Question 370

A third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted. Most decisive verification?

  1. Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior
  2. Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange
  3. Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions
  4. Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted It checks whether apply app access policies, understandable consent and administrative approval for sensitive integrations.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange” needs to be evaluated against A third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted. The relevant check is Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior; An OAuth consent screen is not a substitute for enterprise security review or least-privilege configuration.

C:

“Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions” needs to be evaluated against A third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted. The relevant check is Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior; An OAuth consent screen is not a substitute for enterprise security review or least-privilege configuration.

D:

“Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling” needs to be evaluated against A third-party app requests authorization from a user who does not understand the data access being granted. The relevant check is Review approved client identity, app scopes, grant history and denied-consent behavior; An OAuth consent screen is not a substitute for enterprise security review or least-privilege configuration.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests