Microsoft PL-300 Bundle

Scope sharing to the approved Finance identity group. This solves “access link intended only for the Finance group”; the stated issue is “two different security groups, one broader than intended”.

Building new reports is a distinct capability from reading a report. Its application is “to build new analysis from the underlying model”, not the need “two different security groups, one broader than intended”.

Public embedding is not a secure distribution mechanism for confidential data. That is a different operating condition from “two different security groups, one broader than intended”: “Publish to web for confidential internal finance data”.

Unrelated facts might not inherit filtering from an RLS-secured dimension. That is a different operating condition from “also hides the SalaryRate column from schema discovery”: “but some fact tables remain disconnected and visible”.

Complex relationship paths need explicit negative access tests. The present requirement is “also hides the SalaryRate column from schema discovery”; “uses a many-to-many bridge between users and departments” is a distinct situation.

Sensitive columns need explicit protection rather than merely hiding them in Fields pane. That matters for “internal notes while still allowing product sales summaries” rather than the condition “also hides the SalaryRate column from schema discovery”.

Hiding fields simplifies presentation without removing model access rights. The boundary it addresses is “and assumes it becomes inaccessible to model builders”, while this case concerns “internal notes while still allowing product sales summaries”.

RLS restricts rows; OLS is designed to restrict selected model objects. This solves “also hides the SalaryRate column from schema discovery”; the stated issue is “internal notes while still allowing product sales summaries”.

Unrelated facts might not inherit filtering from an RLS-secured dimension. The deciding difference is “but some fact tables remain disconnected and visible” versus “internal notes while still allowing product sales summaries”.

Sensitive columns need explicit protection rather than merely hiding them in Fields pane. The deciding difference is “internal notes while still allowing product sales summaries” versus “and assumes it becomes inaccessible to model builders”.

Unrelated facts might not inherit filtering from an RLS-secured dimension. Its application is “but some fact tables remain disconnected and visible”, not the need “and assumes it becomes inaccessible to model builders”.

Complex relationship paths need explicit negative access tests. That is a different operating condition from “and assumes it becomes inaccessible to model builders”: “uses a many-to-many bridge between users and departments”.

Sensitive columns need explicit protection rather than merely hiding them in Fields pane. It serves “internal notes while still allowing product sales summaries”, not “but some fact tables remain disconnected and visible”.

Hiding fields simplifies presentation without removing model access rights. The present requirement is “but some fact tables remain disconnected and visible”; “and assumes it becomes inaccessible to model builders” is a distinct situation.

RLS restricts rows; OLS is designed to restrict selected model objects. The boundary it addresses is “also hides the SalaryRate column from schema discovery”, while this case concerns “but some fact tables remain disconnected and visible”.

Unrelated facts might not inherit filtering from an RLS-secured dimension. This solves “but some fact tables remain disconnected and visible”; the stated issue is “uses a many-to-many bridge between users and departments”.

RLS restricts rows; OLS is designed to restrict selected model objects. The deciding difference is “also hides the SalaryRate column from schema discovery” versus “uses a many-to-many bridge between users and departments”.

Hiding fields simplifies presentation without removing model access rights. Its application is “and assumes it becomes inaccessible to model builders”, not the need “uses a many-to-many bridge between users and departments”.

Personalization does not grant new rights beyond established permissions. That is a different operating condition from “and authors expect hidden status to protect them”: “visual and adds a field not originally displayed”.

Slicer selections can be changed and do not enforce data authorization. It serves “users should be unable to see West data”, not “and authors expect hidden status to protect them”.

Export controls should not expose rows outside the viewer's permitted model context. The present requirement is “and authors expect hidden status to protect them”; “exports summarized data under a regional RLS role” is a distinct situation.

Visual visibility does not revoke underlying data access. The present requirement is “users should be unable to see West data”; “but the table still exists in the model” is a distinct situation.

Export controls should not expose rows outside the viewer's permitted model context. That matters for “exports summarized data under a regional RLS role” rather than the condition “users should be unable to see West data”.

Hidden pages are navigation controls, not confidentiality barriers. This solves “and authors expect hidden status to protect them”; the stated issue is “users should be unable to see West data”.

Slicer selections can be changed and do not enforce data authorization. This solves “users should be unable to see West data”; the stated issue is “but the table still exists in the model”.

Personalization does not grant new rights beyond established permissions. The deciding difference is “visual and adds a field not originally displayed” versus “but the table still exists in the model”.

Export controls should not expose rows outside the viewer's permitted model context. Its application is “exports summarized data under a regional RLS role”, not the need “but the table still exists in the model”.

Export controls should not expose rows outside the viewer's permitted model context. It serves “exports summarized data under a regional RLS role”, not “visual and adds a field not originally displayed”.

Visual visibility does not revoke underlying data access. The present requirement is “visual and adds a field not originally displayed”; “but the table still exists in the model” is a distinct situation.

Hidden pages are navigation controls, not confidentiality barriers. That matters for “and authors expect hidden status to protect them” rather than the condition “visual and adds a field not originally displayed”.

Personalization does not grant new rights beyond established permissions. That matters for “visual and adds a field not originally displayed” rather than the condition “exports summarized data under a regional RLS role”.

Hidden pages are navigation controls, not confidentiality barriers. This solves “and authors expect hidden status to protect them”; the stated issue is “exports summarized data under a regional RLS role”.

Slicer selections can be changed and do not enforce data authorization. The deciding difference is “users should be unable to see West data” versus “exports summarized data under a regional RLS role”.