Microsoft PL-300 Bundle

RLS is not enforced for model editors and administrators in that workspace. Its application is “has Workspace Admin and a report uses RLS”, not the need “with a colleague who lacks underlying semantic-model access”.

Build authorizes dependent report creation without editing source model structure. That is a different operating condition from “with a colleague who lacks underlying semantic-model access”: “analyst to design reports using its shared measures”.

Least privilege avoids unnecessary write rights to finance content. The present requirement is “with a colleague who lacks underlying semantic-model access”; “a sensitive finance report and no model-editing capabilities” is a distinct situation.

Protection on exported files depends on format, licensing and tenant policy. The present requirement is “salary columns and needs an information classification label”; “supported by the organization” is a distinct situation.

Classification labels do not automatically replace least-privilege membership. That matters for “Is the label a substitute for workspace permissions” rather than the condition “salary columns and needs an information classification label”.

Misclassification can defeat governance expectations for sensitive data. This solves “Public even though it contains personal health records”; the stated issue is “salary columns and needs an information classification label”.

Sensitivity labels classify content and can support downstream protection policies. This solves “salary columns and needs an information classification label”; the stated issue is “Is the label a substitute for workspace permissions”.

Protection on exported files depends on format, licensing and tenant policy. Its application is “supported by the organization”, not the need “Is the label a substitute for workspace permissions”.

Misclassification can defeat governance expectations for sensitive data. That is a different operating condition from “Is the label a substitute for workspace permissions”: “Public even though it contains personal health records”.

Labels cannot alone prevent every possible form of information disclosure. It serves “assume it prevents every screenshot or manual disclosure”, not “supported by the organization”.

Misclassification can defeat governance expectations for sensitive data. The present requirement is “supported by the organization”; “Public even though it contains personal health records” is a distinct situation.

Classification labels do not automatically replace least-privilege membership. That matters for “Is the label a substitute for workspace permissions” rather than the condition “supported by the organization”.

Labels cannot alone prevent every possible form of information disclosure. That matters for “assume it prevents every screenshot or manual disclosure” rather than the condition “Public even though it contains personal health records”.

Sensitivity labels classify content and can support downstream protection policies. The boundary it addresses is “salary columns and needs an information classification label”, while this case concerns “Public even though it contains personal health records”.

Classification labels do not automatically replace least-privilege membership. This solves “Is the label a substitute for workspace permissions”; the stated issue is “Public even though it contains personal health records”.

Sensitivity labels classify content and can support downstream protection policies. The deciding difference is “salary columns and needs an information classification label” versus “assume it prevents every screenshot or manual disclosure”.

Misclassification can defeat governance expectations for sensitive data. Its application is “Public even though it contains personal health records”, not the need “assume it prevents every screenshot or manual disclosure”.

Protection on exported files depends on format, licensing and tenant policy. It serves “supported by the organization”, not “assume it prevents every screenshot or manual disclosure”.

Remove the contractor from relevant groups, workspace roles and item access. It serves “admin must revoke a former contractor's report access”, not “access link intended only for the Finance group”.

Building new reports is a distinct capability from reading a report. That matters for “to build new analysis from the underlying model” rather than the condition “access link intended only for the Finance group”.

Multiple grants can combine to create wider access than expected. The boundary it addresses is “two different security groups, one broader than intended”, while this case concerns “access link intended only for the Finance group”.

Multiple grants can combine to create wider access than expected. This solves “two different security groups, one broader than intended”; the stated issue is “to build new analysis from the underlying model”.

Public embedding is not a secure distribution mechanism for confidential data. The deciding difference is “Publish to web for confidential internal finance data” versus “to build new analysis from the underlying model”.

Remove the contractor from relevant groups, workspace roles and item access. Its application is “admin must revoke a former contractor's report access”, not the need “to build new analysis from the underlying model”.

Remove the contractor from relevant groups, workspace roles and item access. Its application is “admin must revoke a former contractor's report access”, not the need “Publish to web for confidential internal finance data”.

Scope sharing to the approved Finance identity group. It serves “access link intended only for the Finance group”, not “Publish to web for confidential internal finance data”.

Multiple grants can combine to create wider access than expected. The present requirement is “Publish to web for confidential internal finance data”; “two different security groups, one broader than intended” is a distinct situation.

Multiple grants can combine to create wider access than expected. The present requirement is “admin must revoke a former contractor's report access”; “two different security groups, one broader than intended” is a distinct situation.

Scope sharing to the approved Finance identity group. That matters for “access link intended only for the Finance group” rather than the condition “admin must revoke a former contractor's report access”.

Building new reports is a distinct capability from reading a report. The boundary it addresses is “to build new analysis from the underlying model”, while this case concerns “admin must revoke a former contractor's report access”.

Scope sharing to the approved Finance identity group. This solves “access link intended only for the Finance group”; the stated issue is “two different security groups, one broader than intended”.

Building new reports is a distinct capability from reading a report. Its application is “to build new analysis from the underlying model”, not the need “two different security groups, one broader than intended”.

Public embedding is not a secure distribution mechanism for confidential data. That is a different operating condition from “two different security groups, one broader than intended”: “Publish to web for confidential internal finance data”.