Question 800
An external peer receives a tenant's internal subnets that were supposed to stay private. Which evidence most directly verifies the intended network outcome?
Explanation
Correct Answer
This directly tests the desired result: confirm only approved routes are exchanged and unauthorized prefixes no longer leave the fabric. The decisive investigation is to inspect the route export/import policy and observed advertised routes for the affected VRF. The governing principle is that routing policy and connectivity-template scope determine which tenant prefixes cross external boundaries.
Incorrect Answers
The option “Verify the intended external session and imported/exported prefixes appear only in the proper tenant routing context” is useful in a different setting: A routed external firewall must exchange routes with a border leaf for only one tenant VRF. The case being tested is: An external peer receives a tenant's internal subnets that were supposed to stay private. Routing policy and connectivity-template scope determine which tenant prefixes cross external boundaries. The direct acceptance evidence is “Confirm only approved routes are exchanged and unauthorized prefixes no longer leave the fabric”.
“Confirm the host receives exactly the intended VLANs and no unrelated tenant traffic” is relevant to a different condition: A hypervisor's trunk must carry two allowed application VLANs while leaving unrelated tenant segments inaccessible. The stated question instead concerns: An external peer receives a tenant's internal subnets that were supposed to stay private. Routing policy and connectivity-template scope determine which tenant prefixes cross external boundaries. The direct acceptance evidence is “Confirm only approved routes are exchanged and unauthorized prefixes no longer leave the fabric”.
“Confirm migrated VMs communicate over the intended tenant VN while unauthorized networks remain unreachable” is associated with a distinct issue: A virtualized server moves to another rack and vCenter shows the correct network label while the fabric lacks the required VN attachment. By contrast, the actual problem is: An external peer receives a tenant's internal subnets that were supposed to stay private. Routing policy and connectivity-template scope determine which tenant prefixes cross external boundaries. The direct acceptance evidence is “Confirm only approved routes are exchanged and unauthorized prefixes no longer leave the fabric”.