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HP HPE7-A08 Bundle

Exam Code: HPE7-A08

Exam Name HPE Network Switching Professional

Certification Provider: HP

Corresponding Certification: HPE Aruba Networking Certified Professional - Switching

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HP HPE7-A08 Practice Test 34

Question 330

The HPE AOS-CX switching case is: An IoT device receives a trusted user role after a misconfigured RADIUS return attribute. Which TWO choices together provide the targeted remedy and independent validation? (Select TWO.)

  1. Restrict switch management protocols and administrative roles through approved AAA, SSH and source-policy controls with local recovery access.
  2. Configure supported wired 802.1X access controls, RADIUS policy and explicit fallback for endpoints that cannot authenticate.
  3. Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.
  4. A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds.
  5. A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.

Explanation

Correct Answers

C:

The targeted correction for An IoT device receives a trusted user role after a misconfigured RADIUS return attribute is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model. It reduces the risk that role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain.

E:

A separate operational validation for An IoT device receives a trusted user role after a misconfigured RADIUS return attribute is: A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations. It proves intended behavior instead of accepting configuration presence alone.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case An IoT device receives a trusted user role after a misconfigured RADIUS return attribute requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

B:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case An IoT device receives a trusted user role after a misconfigured RADIUS return attribute requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

D:

This alternative concerns layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection; its associated risk is: Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. The observed case An IoT device receives a trusted user role after a misconfigured RADIUS return attribute requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Question 331

An HPE Aruba Networking engineer observes: A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch. The corrective solution must keep intended connectivity, segmentation, and operational resilience. What is the most defensible operational action before closing the network change?

  1. Restrict switch management protocols and administrative roles through approved AAA, SSH and source-policy controls with local recovery access.
  2. Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.
  3. Configure supported wired 802.1X access controls, RADIUS policy and explicit fallback for endpoints that cannot authenticate.
  4. Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The decisive observed condition is: A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch. The appropriate switching action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model. It addresses the risk that role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. Confirm with: A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

B:

This alternative concerns layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection; its associated risk is: Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. The observed case A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

C:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Question 332

The switch operations team reports: A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch. What is the most relevant operational exposure in this switching scenario?

  1. An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff.
  2. Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain.
  3. Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices.
  4. Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The direct operational failure mode is: Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. It applies to the condition A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch. The suitable corrective action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model. Independently validate using: A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

C:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

D:

This alternative concerns layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection; its associated risk is: Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. The observed case A branch uses central role names but no corresponding downloadable policy is installed on the access switch requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Question 333

An HPE Aruba Networking engineer observes: A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy. The corrective solution must keep intended connectivity, segmentation, and operational resilience. Which implementation or troubleshooting step directly resolves the specific network issue?

  1. Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.
  2. Restrict switch management protocols and administrative roles through approved AAA, SSH and source-policy controls with local recovery access.
  3. Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.
  4. Configure supported wired 802.1X access controls, RADIUS policy and explicit fallback for endpoints that cannot authenticate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The decisive observed condition is: A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy. The appropriate switching action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model. It addresses the risk that role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. Confirm with: A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection; its associated risk is: Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. The observed case A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

B:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

D:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Question 334

An engineer investigates: A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy. Which test would independently confirm expected switch behavior?

  1. A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds.
  2. Authorized identities receive the intended role and unauthorized endpoints remain denied or limited during normal and degraded tests.
  3. A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.
  4. Role-based management login tests enforce least privilege and approved emergency access while insecure services remain disabled.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The independent acceptance evidence for A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy is: A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations. It tests whether the team has actually implemented: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model. An enabled interface or saved configuration by itself is not evidence of complete service recovery.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection; its associated risk is: Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. The observed case A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

B:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

D:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A network team assumes changing a VLAN label alone enforces per-user microsegmentation without role-based policy requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Question 335

An HPE Aruba Networking engineer observes: A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error. The corrective solution must keep intended connectivity, segmentation, and operational resilience. Which response best satisfies the technical requirement without disrupting unrelated traffic?

  1. Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.
  2. Configure supported wired 802.1X access controls, RADIUS policy and explicit fallback for endpoints that cannot authenticate.
  3. Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.
  4. Restrict switch management protocols and administrative roles through approved AAA, SSH and source-policy controls with local recovery access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The decisive observed condition is: A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error. The appropriate switching action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model. It addresses the risk that role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. Confirm with: A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection; its associated risk is: Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. The observed case A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

B:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

D:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Question 336

The switch operations team reports: A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error. What is the most relevant operational exposure in this switching scenario?

  1. Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices.
  2. An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff.
  3. Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain.
  4. Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The direct operational failure mode is: Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. It applies to the condition A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error. The suitable corrective action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model. Independently validate using: A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

B:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

D:

This alternative concerns layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection; its associated risk is: Untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. The observed case A guest authenticates successfully but inherits the administrator's traffic privileges due to a role mapping error requires the more specific dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement control. The targeted action is: Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.

Question 337

An HPE Aruba Networking engineer observes: A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways. The corrective solution must keep intended connectivity, segmentation, and operational resilience. Which change best addresses the observed switching requirement?

  1. Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.
  2. Restrict switch management protocols and administrative roles through approved AAA, SSH and source-policy controls with local recovery access.
  3. Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.
  4. Configure supported wired 802.1X access controls, RADIUS policy and explicit fallback for endpoints that cannot authenticate.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The decisive observed condition is: A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways. The appropriate switching action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services. It addresses the risk that untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. Confirm with: A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement; its associated risk is: Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. The observed case A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

B:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

D:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

Question 338

An engineer investigates: A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways. What network observation should the team require before approving completion?

  1. Authorized identities receive the intended role and unauthorized endpoints remain denied or limited during normal and degraded tests.
  2. A role-specific traffic matrix proves a permitted user reaches allowed services and a different role is blocked from restricted destinations.
  3. Role-based management login tests enforce least privilege and approved emergency access while insecure services remain disabled.
  4. A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The independent acceptance evidence for A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways is: A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds. It tests whether the team has actually implemented: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services. An enabled interface or saved configuration by itself is not evidence of complete service recovery.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

B:

This alternative concerns dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement; its associated risk is: Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. The observed case A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

C:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case A student connects a rogue DHCP service to an open access port and users receive incorrect default gateways requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

Question 339

An HPE Aruba Networking engineer observes: An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions. The corrective solution must keep intended connectivity, segmentation, and operational resilience. What is the most defensible operational action before closing the network change?

  1. Configure supported wired 802.1X access controls, RADIUS policy and explicit fallback for endpoints that cannot authenticate.
  2. Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.
  3. Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.
  4. Restrict switch management protocols and administrative roles through approved AAA, SSH and source-policy controls with local recovery access.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The decisive observed condition is: An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions. The appropriate switching action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services. It addresses the risk that untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications. Confirm with: A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

C:

This alternative concerns dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement; its associated risk is: Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. The observed case An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

D:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

Question 340

The HPE AOS-CX switching case is: An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions. Select TWO: a corrective switching action and separate evidence that the correction worked. (Select TWO.)

  1. Role-based management login tests enforce least privilege and approved emergency access while insecure services remain disabled.
  2. Map authenticated user or device attributes to supported HPE Aruba Networking role-based segmentation with verified policy enforcement on the chosen model.
  3. Configure supported wired 802.1X access controls, RADIUS policy and explicit fallback for endpoints that cannot authenticate.
  4. Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.
  5. A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds.

Explanation

Correct Answers

D:

The targeted correction for An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services. It reduces the risk that untrusted DHCP servers or forged ARP messages can redirect clients or disrupt campus communications.

E:

A separate operational validation for An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions is: A controlled rogue DHCP and ARP spoof test is rejected while legitimate authorized server and client traffic succeeds. It proves intended behavior instead of accepting configuration presence alone.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This alternative concerns management plane aaa ssh and least privilege; its associated risk is: An accessible management interface with weak authorization can expose production switching changes to unauthorized staff. The observed case An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

B:

This alternative concerns dynamic segmentation roles and enforcement; its associated risk is: Role names without operational enforcement can leave different endpoint classes in an improperly shared security domain. The observed case An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.

C:

This alternative concerns 802.1x port authentication and radius policy; its associated risk is: Failing open on authentication loss or applying an unreviewed fallback VLAN can grant excess access to unmanaged devices. The observed case An untrusted port injects ARP replies claiming to be the default gateway and disrupts office sessions requires the more specific layer 2 protection dhcp snooping and arp inspection control. The targeted action is: Apply supported untrusted port controls for DHCP and ARP so rogue responses and spoofed bindings are rejected without breaking legitimate services.