Question 700
A FortiOS 7.6 team examines: A peer sends its certificate identity under a value not accepted by the other gateway. Select TWO complementary choices: the most appropriate corrective action AND the specific evidence confirming success.
Explanation
Correct Answers
The reported FortiOS 7.6 condition is: A peer sends its certificate identity under a value not accepted by the other gateway. The targeted administrative response is: Validate approved IPsec phase-one IKE peer identity, authentication credentials and mutually supported cryptographic proposals on both FortiGate ends. The relevant failure risk is: Peer identity or proposal mismatch can prevent tunnel negotiation even when the internet path and gateway IP are reachable. Validate with: Both intended IKE peers report an established phase-one security association with approved algorithms and correct identities.
For the observed situation (A peer sends its certificate identity under a value not accepted by the other gateway), the most specific acceptance evidence is: Both intended IKE peers report an established phase-one security association with approved algorithms and correct identities. It validates the recommended response: Validate approved IPsec phase-one IKE peer identity, authentication credentials and mutually supported cryptographic proposals on both FortiGate ends. This addresses the documented risk: Peer identity or proposal mismatch can prevent tunnel negotiation even when the internet path and gateway IP are reachable.
Incorrect Answers
IPsec tunnel mtu and fragmentation (5.1) would demonstrate or implement: Large representative authorized payloads pass over the tunnel after bounded MTU adjustments without severe retransmissions. The case states: A peer sends its certificate identity under a value not accepted by the other gateway. The most direct paired action and test is: Validate approved IPsec phase-one IKE peer identity, authentication credentials and mutually supported cryptographic proposals on both FortiGate ends.
VPN hub-and-spoke versus partial mesh topology (5.1) would demonstrate or implement: Assuming spoke-to-spoke reachability in a pure hub model without appropriate routes and policies can blackhole traffic. This case instead tests IPsec phase-one ike identity and proposals; the choice measures or changes another part of the system.
Route-based IPsec tunnel interface design (5.1) addresses another technical failure: A valid tunnel negotiation alone does not install the necessary destination route or permit application traffic. The required paired action and test concerns IPsec phase-one ike identity and proposals; a passing result for this alternative could leave that requirement unresolved.