Question 570
A FortiOS 7.6 team examines: An operations dashboard needs a test proving that a tuned signature still protects other exposed applications. Select TWO complementary choices: the most appropriate corrective action AND the specific evidence confirming success.
Explanation
Correct Answers
For the observed situation (An operations dashboard needs a test proving that a tuned signature still protects other exposed applications), the most specific acceptance evidence is: An authorized legitimate transaction works after tuning while the required nonmalicious detection validation still succeeds. It validates the recommended response: Validate the triggered IPS signature, affected application and safe evidence before creating a narrow documented sensor exception. This addresses the documented risk: Globally disabling an IPS category to suppress one suspected false positive can expose unrelated vulnerable services.
The reported FortiOS 7.6 condition is: An operations dashboard needs a test proving that a tuned signature still protects other exposed applications. The targeted administrative response is: Validate the triggered IPS signature, affected application and safe evidence before creating a narrow documented sensor exception. The relevant failure risk is: Globally disabling an IPS category to suppress one suspected false positive can expose unrelated vulnerable services. Validate with: An authorized legitimate transaction works after tuning while the required nonmalicious detection validation still succeeds.
Incorrect Answers
Certificate-chain expiry and handshake diagnosis (3.1) would demonstrate or implement: Blanket bypass of certificate validation can conceal expired or untrusted servers and unsafe TLS behavior. The case states: the most appropriate corrective action AND the specific evidence confirming success. The most direct paired action and test is: An authorized legitimate transaction works after tuning while the required nonmalicious detection validation still succeeds.
Antivirus inspection of encrypted downloads (3.4) would demonstrate or implement: A controlled HTTPS test shows the approved file is inspected under the intended full-inspection policy without trust errors. This choice can be useful for that problem, but it does not establish the Ips false-positive exception and tuning control being assessed here.
Application control signature matching (3.3) addresses another technical failure: A generic port allow does not distinguish approved from prohibited applications sharing encrypted or common ports. The required paired action and test concerns Ips false-positive exception and tuning; a passing result for this alternative could leave that requirement unresolved.