Question 390
A FortiOS 7.6 team examines: A valid inbound TLS service works directly but fails when the FortiGate SSL protection profile is attached. Select TWO complementary choices: the most appropriate corrective action AND the specific evidence confirming success.
Explanation
Correct Answers
The reported FortiOS 7.6 condition is: A valid inbound TLS service works directly but fails when the FortiGate SSL protection profile is attached. The targeted administrative response is: Use an appropriate supported protected-server SSL inspection configuration and valid server certificate material for authorized inbound HTTPS inspection. The relevant failure risk is: An appliance lacking the proper protected-server certificate cannot safely present the intended server identity during inspection. Validate with: An authorized external TLS client validates the protected service certificate and the required inspection policy generates expected logs.
For the observed situation (A valid inbound TLS service works directly but fails when the FortiGate SSL protection profile is attached), the most specific acceptance evidence is: An authorized external TLS client validates the protected service certificate and the required inspection policy generates expected logs. It validates the recommended response: Use an appropriate supported protected-server SSL inspection configuration and valid server certificate material for authorized inbound HTTPS inspection. This addresses the documented risk: An appliance lacking the proper protected-server certificate cannot safely present the intended server identity during inspection.
Incorrect Answers
Static url filtering and rule precedence (3.2) would demonstrate or implement: Tests of the exact allowed and denied hostnames show the intended outcome and rule ID in logs. This choice can be useful for that problem, but it does not establish the Inbound protected ssl server certificate handling control being assessed here.
Antivirus scanning profiles on permitted flows (3.4) addresses another technical failure: Without applied antivirus inspection or fresh signatures, malicious transferred content may not be detected. This case instead tests Inbound protected ssl server certificate handling; the choice measures or changes another part of the system.
Application signatures and false-positive review (3.3) would demonstrate or implement: A broad category override can silently re-allow truly prohibited software while hiding identification errors. The paired-answer requirement concerns Inbound protected ssl server certificate handling; this alternative does not provide the matching intervention and separate acceptance evidence.