Question 160
In a Cisco AI Technical Practitioner study scenario, the team discovers: An agent prepares a safe file move, obtains user approval and later substitutes a different destination folder before execution while treating the old approval as valid. Which underlying AI system principle explains these observations?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The technical basis is: An approval should bind to the proposed action and critical parameters; changing the target after review invalidates the original authorization. Resolve this through: Bind approval to an immutable action summary and destination identifier and ask for renewed consent when material fields change. The expected evidence is: A modified destination attempt is blocked pending new approval, while the original agreed move completes under its exact authorized parameters.
Incorrect Answers
Human-in-the-loop control is appropriate when an agent action changes data exposure, and drafting permission does not imply permission to disclose protected records. “Create a reviewable redacted export preview and require an authorized human approval with validated recipient and scope before sending” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: an approval should bind to the proposed action and critical parameters; changing the target after review invalidates the original authorization.
“Limit the support agent to read capabilities and require a separately authorized elevated session or approval for destructive inventory operations” is the supported response when tool availability does not equal authorization; MCP-connected operations still need scoped identity, least privilege and independent enforcement of sensitive side effects. Here the decisive response is “Bind approval to an immutable action summary and destination identifier and ask for renewed consent when material fields change”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.
MCP clients and servers must agree on compatible protocol capabilities and message patterns, so unverified version assumptions can break interoperability. “Use the supported version and capability negotiation or discovery flow for the selected MCP implementation and handle incompatible features explicitly” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is an agent prepares a safe file move, obtains user approval and later substitutes a different destination folder before execution while treating the old approval as valid; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.