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Cisco 300-420 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 48

Question 470

An enterprise network design must address this condition: A campus distribution redesign installs a stateful firewall on one inter-building path while a lower-cost IGP return route bypasses that firewall. Which analysis best identifies the architectural gap?

  1. Stateful inspection needs coherent bidirectional flow visibility, while independent routing cost choices can create asymmetric paths.
  2. Link redundancy within the fabric does not guarantee sufficient external border forwarding capacity during degraded operation.
  3. A summary advertised by a border without valid components can attract and blackhole traffic during partial network failures.
  4. Physical redundancy does not imply control-plane equal-cost path installation or useful flow distribution.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The relevant principle is: Stateful inspection needs coherent bidirectional flow visibility, while independent routing cost choices can create asymmetric paths. A valid architectural response is: Select a topology and route policy that maintain suitable symmetric inspected paths or supported state sharing. The expected evidence is: End-to-end sessions survive and traces show both request and reply traverse the intended inspection context.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Link redundancy within the fabric does not guarantee sufficient external border forwarding capacity during degraded operation. “Size border nodes and redundant exits for N-minus-one load, applying failure-domain and traffic-engineering requirements” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: stateful inspection needs coherent bidirectional flow visibility, while independent routing cost choices can create asymmetric paths.

C:

“Tie aggregate advertisement to required downstream reachability or redesign summarization and redundancy accordingly” is the supported response when a summary advertised by a border without valid components can attract and blackhole traffic during partial network failures. Here the decisive response is “Select a topology and route policy that maintain suitable symmetric inspected paths or supported state sharing”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Physical redundancy does not imply control-plane equal-cost path installation or useful flow distribution. “Align appropriate IGP costs and supported equal-cost multipath settings with capacity and symmetric path requirements” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a campus distribution redesign installs a stateful firewall on one inter-building path while a lower-cost IGP return route bypasses that firewall; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 471

A regional network architect receives this requirement: A campus fabric has one control-plane node that maintains all endpoint registrations, and a planned node upgrade makes roaming users unreachable. Which underlying design principle best explains this result?

  1. Identity group classification requires a trusted policy source and onboarding process rather than arbitrary address-based role guessing.
  2. Fabric overlay multicast support and replication design have specific control and data-plane requirements beyond simple underlay multicast reachability.
  3. Security group policy alone may not replace full virtual-network level route isolation where separate macrosegments are required.
  4. A single endpoint map/control-plane service is a common-mode availability risk even with redundant data-plane links.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The relevant principle is: A single endpoint map/control-plane service is a common-mode availability risk even with redundant data-plane links. A valid architectural response is: Design supported control-plane node redundancy and test endpoint registration continuity during node loss. The expected evidence is: Endpoint moves and routed fabric sessions continue through an approved redundant control-plane service.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Identity group classification requires a trusted policy source and onboarding process rather than arbitrary address-based role guessing. “Integrate the fabric with appropriate Cisco ISE identity policy and validated endpoint profiling or authentication flows” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: a single endpoint map/control-plane service is a common-mode availability risk even with redundant data-plane links.

B:

“Select a supported SD-Access multicast forwarding model and test receivers across fabric edges and virtual networks” is the supported response when fabric overlay multicast support and replication design have specific control and data-plane requirements beyond simple underlay multicast reachability. Here the decisive response is “Design supported control-plane node redundancy and test endpoint registration continuity during node loss”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

C:

Security group policy alone may not replace full virtual-network level route isolation where separate macrosegments are required. “Design distinct fabric virtual networks with appropriate external borders and tightly defined shared services” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a campus fabric has one control-plane node that maintains all endpoint registrations, and a planned node upgrade makes roaming users unreachable; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 472

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: After replacing a branch Internet router, its DMVPN tunnel interface can reach the public network but the spoke no longer appears as registered at the hub. Which intervention most directly corrects this failure?

  1. Align supported NHRP and tunnel registration settings and verify the hub can map the spoke's current public transport address.
  2. Use a supported DMVPN phase and NHRP routing design that safely establishes eligible spoke-to-spoke tunnels.
  3. Combine supported GRE transport with an appropriate IPsec protection design, or select a secure alternative meeting multicast needs.
  4. Compare direct cloud private interconnect with managed Internet VPN based on security, bandwidth, route exchange and service commitments.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The design gap is: Dynamic spoke resolution needs correct NHRP network ID, authentication, hub mapping and reachable tunnel source rather than only a live Internet connection. The recommended correction is: Align supported NHRP and tunnel registration settings and verify the hub can map the spoke's current public transport address. Validate it through: The hub lists the registered spoke and protected branch routing sessions establish over the intended tunnel.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change concerns dmvpn spoke to spoke optimization, where A purely hub-and-spoke forwarding policy can add latency and load when the DMVPN design is intended to allow direct spoke shortcuts. The reported issue instead stems from: Dynamic spoke resolution needs correct NHRP network ID, authentication, hub mapping and reachable tunnel source rather than only a live Internet connection.

C:

That change concerns ipsec encryption versus gre transport, where GRE provides encapsulation for multiple protocols but does not itself encrypt or authenticate payload confidentiality. In this question the necessary remedy is “Align supported NHRP and tunnel registration settings and verify the hub can map the spoke's current public transport address”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns cloud wan direct private connectivity choice, where An encrypted Internet overlay does not provide the same private carrier connectivity, SLA and traffic-engineering options as a qualified dedicated cloud circuit. The observed condition is after replacing a branch Internet router, its DMVPN tunnel interface can reach the public network but the spoke no longer appears as registered at the hub; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 473

During a resilience simulation, the architecture team notes: Two equal-bandwidth routed building uplinks are available but all flows pass one link because IGP costs and ECMP eligibility were not considered. Which measured observation confirms the intended architecture?

  1. Access-layer multichassis links stay forwarding with the intended logical control model during a tested member failure.
  2. After a campus partition, traffic to the server block follows the border retaining a real path rather than a blind summary.
  3. Both eligible next hops appear as intended and multiple test flows use the network without creating routing loops.
  4. Guest clients resolve names using the approved DNS service but cannot reach protected management networks.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This directly validates equal cost site routing load sharing: Physical redundancy does not imply control-plane equal-cost path installation or useful flow distribution. The linked design intervention is: Align appropriate IGP costs and supported equal-cost multipath settings with capacity and symmetric path requirements. Results concerning another subsystem do not prove this requirement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A virtualized or stacked switching design needs supported control, state and multichassis link mechanisms to act as one logical system. “Select a validated stacking or virtual-switch architecture and plan supervisor, interconnect and software compatibility” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: physical redundancy does not imply control-plane equal-cost path installation or useful flow distribution.

B:

“Tie aggregate advertisement to required downstream reachability or redesign summarization and redundancy accordingly” is the supported response when a summary advertised by a border without valid components can attract and blackhole traffic during partial network failures. Here the decisive response is “Align appropriate IGP costs and supported equal-cost multipath settings with capacity and symmetric path requirements”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Unfiltered inter-VRF route leaking can undermine segmentation even if each tenant has its own routing instance. “Export only authorized service prefixes and apply necessary packet access restrictions at the shared-services border” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is two equal-bandwidth routed building uplinks are available but all flows pass one link because IGP costs and ECMP eligibility were not considered; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 474

A campus and WAN design workshop reports: A corporation connects twice to one upstream AS and wants to suggest a preferred entry point to that neighbor, yet edits only routing metrics inside its own OSPF core. What is the most relevant cause of the design failure?

  1. Translation adds stateful dependencies and application edge cases that may be unnecessary when a controlled native dual-stack phase is viable.
  2. AS-path prepending mainly affects remote path selection; outbound path preference within the local AS is commonly controlled with local preference.
  3. Internal OSPF cost does not communicate an intended interconnect preference to the neighboring autonomous system.
  4. IBGP typically preserves the external next hop, which must be reachable through the internal routing infrastructure.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The relevant principle is: Internal OSPF cost does not communicate an intended interconnect preference to the neighboring autonomous system. A valid architectural response is: Use supported BGP MED where appropriate, coordinate the provider's comparison behavior and keep resilient alternate exits. The expected evidence is: The upstream chooses the intended link when its policy compares MED, while failover still works on link loss.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Translation adds stateful dependencies and application edge cases that may be unnecessary when a controlled native dual-stack phase is viable. “Select native dual stack for capable segments and reserve translation for real IPv4-only boundaries with documented requirements” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: internal OSPF cost does not communicate an intended interconnect preference to the neighboring autonomous system.

B:

“Set governed BGP local preference on inbound routes from the preferred provider, with consistent internal propagation” is the supported response when AS-path prepending mainly affects remote path selection; outbound path preference within the local AS is commonly controlled with local preference. Here the decisive response is “Use supported BGP MED where appropriate, coordinate the provider's comparison behavior and keep resilient alternate exits”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

IBGP typically preserves the external next hop, which must be reachable through the internal routing infrastructure. “Provide appropriate next-hop-self policy or valid internal reachability for external BGP next hops with loop-free forwarding” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a corporation connects twice to one upstream AS and wants to suggest a preferred entry point to that neighbor, yet edits only routing metrics inside its own OSPF core; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 475

A regional network architect receives this requirement: A remote OSPF branch must inject routes from a local non-OSPF process while still limiting external flooding from the rest of the enterprise. Which ongoing design review best prevents recurrence?

  1. Verify NSSA translation and ABR failover when adding local redistribution at a stub-like branch.
  2. Document OSPF external metric type as part of every redistribution design review.
  3. Review area stub restrictions and ASBR needs before switching any area type.
  4. Keep OSPF area allocation aligned with IPAM aggregation boundaries across expansion projects.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This design guardrail addresses ospf nssa external redistribution: A totally stubby or regular stub area cannot originate external LSAs through an internal ASBR in the required manner. Long-term prevention is: Verify NSSA translation and ABR failover when adding local redistribution at a stub-like branch. A generic control for another failure mode is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

B:

External Type 2 cost behavior does not account for internal cost in the same way as Type 1 when external metrics differ. “Document OSPF external metric type as part of every redistribution design review” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: a totally stubby or regular stub area cannot originate external LSAs through an internal ASBR in the required manner.

C:

“Review area stub restrictions and ASBR needs before switching any area type” is the supported response when a normal area floods external routing information that stub-capable branches may not need when a default route is sufficient. Here the decisive response is “Verify NSSA translation and ABR failover when adding local redistribution at a stub-like branch”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

A fragmented area-address plan and missing ABR inter-area summarization cause avoidable detailed LSAs to propagate. “Keep OSPF area allocation aligned with IPAM aggregation boundaries across expansion projects” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a remote OSPF branch must inject routes from a local non-OSPF process while still limiting external flooding from the rest of the enterprise; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 476

A network engineering team compares alternatives after discovering: A company deploys IPv6-only client VLANs that must reach legacy IPv4-only APIs, but assumes routing IPv6 packets directly to IPv4 server addresses is possible. Which design decision resolves the stated requirement?

  1. Design appropriate NAT64 plus DNS64 service boundaries, DNS behavior and application compatibility exceptions.
  2. Apply explicit approved outbound prefix filters at the eBGP boundary and validate maximum prefix expectations.
  3. Budget tunnel overhead in MTU planning, preserve required ICMPv6 control messages and validate endpoints' segment sizes.
  4. Select native dual stack for capable segments and reserve translation for real IPv4-only boundaries with documented requirements.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The design gap is: IPv6-only clients cannot communicate with IPv4-only services without supported translation and suitable destination synthesis. The recommended correction is: Design appropriate NAT64 plus DNS64 service boundaries, DNS behavior and application compatibility exceptions. Validate it through: A client reaches approved IPv4-only services through translated IPv6 destinations while native IPv6 remains unaffected.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change concerns BGP prefix filter outbound boundary, where Unrestricted BGP export policy exposes destinations not authorized for upstream announcement and risks routing leaks. The reported issue instead stems from: IPv6-only clients cannot communicate with IPv4-only services without supported translation and suitable destination synthesis.

C:

That change concerns ipv6 overlay mtu and pmtud, where Overlay headers reduce usable path MTU and blocked ICMPv6 Packet Too Big feedback can prevent Path MTU Discovery. In this question the necessary remedy is “Design appropriate NAT64 plus DNS64 service boundaries, DNS behavior and application compatibility exceptions”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns ipv6 dual stack versus translation cost, where Translation adds stateful dependencies and application edge cases that may be unnecessary when a controlled native dual-stack phase is viable. The observed condition is a company deploys IPv6-only client VLANs that must reach legacy IPv4-only APIs, but assumes routing IPv6 packets directly to IPv4 server addresses is possible; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 477

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: An edge device has two BGP paths to the same prefix but operators expect load sharing merely because both routes appear in the neighbor table. What governance check would most directly reduce future risk?

  1. Reassess multipath qualification whenever route attributes, providers or platform software change.
  2. Monitor tunnel endpoint resilience and account for encapsulation overhead in path MTU design.
  3. Govern community naming, collision avoidance and route-leak tests across all border routers.
  4. Test graceful-restart interactions with BFD and forwarding readiness during platform changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

This design guardrail addresses BGP multipath equal cost eligibility: BGP additional paths must satisfy supported multipath eligibility rules and configured maximum-path policy to share traffic. Long-term prevention is: Reassess multipath qualification whenever route attributes, providers or platform software change. A generic control for another failure mode is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

B:

An IPv4-only underlay cannot natively carry IPv6 forwarding without an overlay or other transition capability. “Monitor tunnel endpoint resilience and account for encapsulation overhead in path MTU design” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: BGP additional paths must satisfy supported multipath eligibility rules and configured maximum-path policy to share traffic.

C:

“Govern community naming, collision avoidance and route-leak tests across all border routers” is the supported response when manual per-prefix policy misses newly onboarded routes when attributes and export rules are not centrally classified. Here the decisive response is “Reassess multipath qualification whenever route attributes, providers or platform software change”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Graceful restart depends on both peers' supported capabilities and bounded stale-route handling, not merely a routing session name. “Test graceful-restart interactions with BFD and forwarding readiness during platform changes” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is an edge device has two BGP paths to the same prefix but operators expect load sharing merely because both routes appear in the neighbor table; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 478

A campus and WAN design workshop reports: Two regional WAN links each run at eighty percent peak utilization, but design documents promise full service during loss of either one. Which outcome is the strongest evidence of a correct solution?

  1. Projected channel capacity fits the fiber path and optical power measurements meet tested margins under loss of a protection span.
  2. Voice calls meet measured latency and loss targets during normal and backup routing without relying on peak bandwidth alone.
  3. End-to-end sessions reestablish through the backup under an actual provider failure with correct source addresses.
  4. A single-link failure leaves critical application throughput within targets and less-critical traffic receives planned throttling.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This directly validates wan circuit oversubscription under failover: N-minus-one operation cannot carry combined load if each remaining link lacks spare capacity or business traffic prioritization. The linked design intervention is: Size redundant WAN capacity for failure-state critical loads or design explicit congestion and traffic-class degradation policy. Results concerning another subsystem do not prove this requirement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Ordinary port-level upgrades may not meet aggregate fiber-capacity and distance requirements when the optical transport must host many independent wavelengths. “Evaluate supported DWDM wavelengths, optics, optical budget, dispersion and protection channels for the transport design” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: n-minus-one operation cannot carry combined load if each remaining link lacks spare capacity or business traffic prioritization.

B:

“Choose appropriate low-latency WAN transport and QoS treatment, evaluating cost, resilience and route diversity” is the supported response when bandwidth alone does not determine application suitability when propagation delay and jitter exceed interactive service limits. Here the decisive response is “Size redundant WAN capacity for failure-state critical loads or design explicit congestion and traffic-class degradation policy”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

C:

Multihoming and address translation must account for both directions; outbound route changes alone may not preserve return paths. “Design consistent BGP advertisement, NAT and routing failover so return flows follow the reachable secondary path” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is two regional WAN links each run at eighty percent peak utilization, but design documents promise full service during loss of either one; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 479

During a resilience simulation, the architecture team notes: A guest campus VRF is permitted to reach a shared DNS service but a broad route leak accidentally exposes internal management subnets. Which analysis best identifies the architectural gap?

  1. Unfiltered inter-VRF route leaking can undermine segmentation even if each tenant has its own routing instance.
  2. Fabric overlay multicast support and replication design have specific control and data-plane requirements beyond simple underlay multicast reachability.
  3. A summary advertised by a border without valid components can attract and blackhole traffic during partial network failures.
  4. High session counts and excessively aggressive timers can exhaust control resources and cause false routing flaps.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The relevant principle is: Unfiltered inter-VRF route leaking can undermine segmentation even if each tenant has its own routing instance. A valid architectural response is: Export only authorized service prefixes and apply necessary packet access restrictions at the shared-services border. The expected evidence is: Guest clients resolve names using the approved DNS service but cannot reach protected management networks.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Fabric overlay multicast support and replication design have specific control and data-plane requirements beyond simple underlay multicast reachability. “Select a supported SD-Access multicast forwarding model and test receivers across fabric edges and virtual networks” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: unfiltered inter-VRF route leaking can undermine segmentation even if each tenant has its own routing instance.

C:

“Tie aggregate advertisement to required downstream reachability or redesign summarization and redundancy accordingly” is the supported response when a summary advertised by a border without valid components can attract and blackhole traffic during partial network failures. Here the decisive response is “Export only authorized service prefixes and apply necessary packet access restrictions at the shared-services border”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

High session counts and excessively aggressive timers can exhaust control resources and cause false routing flaps. “Model required convergence classes and scale BFD deployment selectively on critical routed interfaces” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a guest campus VRF is permitted to reach a shared DNS service but a broad route leak accidentally exposes internal management subnets; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 480

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: A retailer wants two facilities to operate on one Ethernet broadcast domain across a managed provider network, but its proposed ordinary routed MPLS L3VPN does not transport Ethernet frames. Which analysis best identifies the architectural gap?

  1. An MPLS Layer 3 VPN routes IP among separated CE networks rather than delivering a transparent Layer 2 Ethernet service.
  2. Using only the affected data-plane overlay for operational access can eliminate remote troubleshooting when the fabric fails.
  3. A shared provider routing domain cannot preserve independent overlapping tenant address spaces and route targets without isolation.
  4. Mobile backup is useful only if real coverage, policy, cost and failure independence support required branch services.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The relevant principle is: An MPLS Layer 3 VPN routes IP among separated CE networks rather than delivering a transparent Layer 2 Ethernet service. A valid architectural response is: Choose an eligible provider Layer 2 VPN or Ethernet private line design if extending a broadcast domain is genuinely required. The expected evidence is: Representative VLAN-tagged frames reach the remote Ethernet service and a controlled loop test remains contained under documented safeguards.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Using only the affected data-plane overlay for operational access can eliminate remote troubleshooting when the fabric fails. “Provide an appropriately secured independent management path or out-of-band recovery access for critical WAN edges” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: an MPLS Layer 3 VPN routes IP among separated CE networks rather than delivering a transparent Layer 2 Ethernet service.

C:

“Select a supported MPLS L3VPN design using separate VPN routing tables and approved route-target import/export policy” is the supported response when a shared provider routing domain cannot preserve independent overlapping tenant address spaces and route targets without isolation. Here the decisive response is “Choose an eligible provider Layer 2 VPN or Ethernet private line design if extending a broadcast domain is genuinely required”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Mobile backup is useful only if real coverage, policy, cost and failure independence support required branch services. “Design cellular failover with tested signal strength, provider diversity, data-plan capacity and selective critical traffic routing” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a retailer wants two facilities to operate on one Ethernet broadcast domain across a managed provider network, but its proposed ordinary routed MPLS L3VPN does not transport Ethernet frames; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.