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Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

Reliable & Actual Study Materials for Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Exam Success

58 Questions & Answers with Testing Engine

"Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect" Testing Engine covers all the knowledge points of the real Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect exam.

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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 55

Question 540

A browser OAuth app ignores CSRF state and accepts a callback from an unrelated authorization request. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Use a login flow for approved post-authentication business steps without replacing core authentication controls. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: Disabling future logins alone may not prove all previously issued sessions and grants are unusable.
  2. Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration.
  3. Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.
  4. Action: Preserve Setup Audit Trail and relevant configuration-change evidence with approved retention. Verification: Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a browser OAuth app ignores CSRF state and accepts a callback from an unrelated authorization request Test against test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; a trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Use a login flow for approved post-authentication business steps without replacing core authentication controls. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: Disabling future logins alone may not prove all previously issued sessions and grants are unusable” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a browser OAuth app ignores CSRF state and accepts a callback from an unrelated authorization request The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

B:

“Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a browser OAuth app ignores CSRF state and accepts a callback from an unrelated authorization request The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

D:

“Action: Preserve Setup Audit Trail and relevant configuration-change evidence with approved retention. Verification: Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a browser OAuth app ignores CSRF state and accepts a callback from an unrelated authorization request The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Question 541

A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. Best next IAM response?

  1. Use a login flow for approved post-authentication business steps without replacing core authentication controls
  2. Preserve Setup Audit Trail and relevant configuration-change evidence with approved retention
  3. Enforce app-specific policy and least privilege across client registration, OAuth scopes and underlying user permissions
  4. Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins Test against test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; a trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Use a login flow for approved post-authentication business steps without replacing core authentication controls” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

B:

“Preserve Setup Audit Trail and relevant configuration-change evidence with approved retention” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

C:

“Enforce app-specific policy and least privilege across client registration, OAuth scopes and underlying user permissions” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Question 542

A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. Most decisive verification?

  1. Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs
  2. Track issuer metadata, certificate fingerprints, trust change approvals and login test results
  3. Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths
  4. Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins It checks whether protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Track issuer metadata, certificate fingerprints, trust change approvals and login test results” needs to be evaluated against A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. The relevant check is Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

C:

“Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths” needs to be evaluated against A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. The relevant check is Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

D:

“Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review” needs to be evaluated against A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. The relevant check is Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Question 543

A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. Key caution for this case?

  1. Updating directory membership is not always equivalent to promptly revoking application-side access
  2. Disabling future logins alone may not prove all previously issued sessions and grants are unusable
  3. Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration
  4. A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe” needs to be evaluated against A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. The relevant check is Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Updating directory membership is not always equivalent to promptly revoking application-side access” needs to be evaluated against A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. The relevant check is Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

B:

“Disabling future logins alone may not prove all previously issued sessions and grants are unusable” needs to be evaluated against A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. The relevant check is Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

C:

“Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration” needs to be evaluated against A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. The relevant check is Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Question 544

A mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Preserve Setup Audit Trail and relevant configuration-change evidence with approved retention. Verification: Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.
  2. Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.
  3. Action: Use a login flow for approved post-authentication business steps without replacing core authentication controls. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: Disabling future logins alone may not prove all previously issued sessions and grants are unusable.
  4. Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins Test against test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs; a trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Preserve Setup Audit Trail and relevant configuration-change evidence with approved retention. Verification: Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths. Boundary: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

C:

“Action: Use a login flow for approved post-authentication business steps without replacing core authentication controls. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: Disabling future logins alone may not prove all previously issued sessions and grants are unusable” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

D:

“Action: Protect OAuth state, PKCE where appropriate, sensitive token storage and registered redirect validation. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs for a mobile application copies an access token into a support ticket while troubleshooting logins The controlling boundary is: A trusted Salesforce endpoint does not make insecure client-side token or redirect practices safe.

Question 545

A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. Best next IAM response?

  1. Require supported multifactor authentication and a tested recovery strategy appropriate to user risk
  2. Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing
  3. Favor minimum profiles plus targeted permission sets and permission-set groups for approved duties
  4. Reconcile entitlement changes and verify effective session or token behavior after role removal

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login Test against rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Require supported multifactor authentication and a tested recovery strategy appropriate to user risk” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

C:

“Favor minimum profiles plus targeted permission sets and permission-set groups for approved duties” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

D:

“Reconcile entitlement changes and verify effective session or token behavior after role removal” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Question 546

A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. Most decisive verification?

  1. Inspect permission activation event, session level, granted rights and expiration
  2. Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs
  3. Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths
  4. Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login It checks whether design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Inspect permission activation event, session level, granted rights and expiration” needs to be evaluated against A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

B:

“Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs” needs to be evaluated against A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

C:

“Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths” needs to be evaluated against A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Question 547

A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. Key caution for this case?

  1. Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration
  2. Global MFA disablement is not a safe default response to one person's lost device
  3. Broad IP whitelists or forced bypasses can undermine access control or lock out legitimate workers
  4. Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users” needs to be evaluated against A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Availability and retention of enhanced event data depend on current product entitlements and configuration” needs to be evaluated against A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

B:

“Global MFA disablement is not a safe default response to one person's lost device” needs to be evaluated against A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

C:

“Broad IP whitelists or forced bypasses can undermine access control or lock out legitimate workers” needs to be evaluated against A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Question 548

A mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.
  2. Action: Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: Broad IP whitelists or forced bypasses can undermine access control or lock out legitimate workers.
  3. Action: Require supported multifactor authentication and a tested recovery strategy appropriate to user risk. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Global MFA disablement is not a safe default response to one person's lost device.
  4. Action: Reconcile entitlement changes and verify effective session or token behavior after role removal. Verification: Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths. Boundary: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Action: Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login Test against rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Action: Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing. Verification: Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs. Boundary: Broad IP whitelists or forced bypasses can undermine access control or lock out legitimate workers” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

C:

“Action: Require supported multifactor authentication and a tested recovery strategy appropriate to user risk. Verification: Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review. Boundary: Global MFA disablement is not a safe default response to one person's lost device” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

D:

“Action: Reconcile entitlement changes and verify effective session or token behavior after role removal. Verification: Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths. Boundary: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a mandatory SSO migration disables direct passwords and no administrator has a tested fallback login The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Question 549

A company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access. Best next IAM response?

  1. Require supported multifactor authentication and a tested recovery strategy appropriate to user risk
  2. Reconcile entitlement changes and verify effective session or token behavior after role removal
  3. Favor minimum profiles plus targeted permission sets and permission-set groups for approved duties
  4. Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access Test against rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Require supported multifactor authentication and a tested recovery strategy appropriate to user risk” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

B:

“Reconcile entitlement changes and verify effective session or token behavior after role removal” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

C:

“Favor minimum profiles plus targeted permission sets and permission-set groups for approved duties” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review for a company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access The controlling boundary is: Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Question 550

A company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access. Most decisive verification?

  1. Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review
  2. Inspect permission activation event, session level, granted rights and expiration
  3. Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths
  4. Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access It checks whether design controlled break-glass accounts and tested recovery paths that preserve MFA and auditing.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Inspect permission activation event, session level, granted rights and expiration” needs to be evaluated against A company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

C:

“Validate login flow assignment, post-login screen, cancel behavior and emergency access paths” needs to be evaluated against A company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

D:

“Test state mismatch, invalid verifier, exposed-token handling and safe support logs” needs to be evaluated against A company loses its central identity provider during an outage and cannot administer Salesforce emergency access. The relevant check is Rehearse IdP outage, alternative admin login, credential custody and post-use review; Emergency access should be narrow, time-limited and auditable rather than a permanent SSO bypass for all users.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests