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Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 32

Question 310

A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. Most decisive verification?

  1. Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests
  2. Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent
  3. Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments
  4. Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials It checks whether enable Salesforce as the identity provider and register the external service provider using supported SAML app configuration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests” needs to be evaluated against A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. The relevant check is Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

B:

“Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent” needs to be evaluated against A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. The relevant check is Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

D:

“Inspect registered redirect URI, actual callback, state value and rejection logs” needs to be evaluated against A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. The relevant check is Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

Question 311

A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. Key caution for this case?

  1. A JWT's signature alone does not authorize any user or resource outside the registered app and org policy
  2. A public client cannot rely on an embedded long-term secret as a confidential client would
  3. Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration
  4. Client credentials does not implicitly represent an individual interactive user or bypass org authorization

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” needs to be evaluated against A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. The relevant check is Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“A JWT's signature alone does not authorize any user or resource outside the registered app and org policy” needs to be evaluated against A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. The relevant check is Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

B:

“A public client cannot rely on an embedded long-term secret as a confidential client would” needs to be evaluated against A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. The relevant check is Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

D:

“Client credentials does not implicitly represent an individual interactive user or bypass org authorization” needs to be evaluated against A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. The relevant check is Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

Question 312

A research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Client credentials does not implicitly represent an individual interactive user or bypass org authorization.
  2. Action: Coordinate Salesforce IdP signing certificate rollover with service providers and preserve fallback verification. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.
  3. Action: Enable Salesforce as the identity provider and register the external service provider using supported SAML app configuration. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: A JWT's signature alone does not authorize any user or resource outside the registered app and org policy.
  4. Action: Enable Salesforce as the identity provider and register the external service provider using supported SAML app configuration. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Action: Enable Salesforce as the identity provider and register the external service provider using supported SAML app configuration. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials Test against validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments; salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Consider supported OAuth client credentials under a dedicated run-as user and explicit access policy where appropriate. Verification: Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments. Boundary: Client credentials does not implicitly represent an individual interactive user or bypass org authorization” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments for a research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials The controlling boundary is: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

B:

“Action: Coordinate Salesforce IdP signing certificate rollover with service providers and preserve fallback verification. Verification: Test device/user codes, verification URI, polling interval, expiration and consent. Boundary: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments for a research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials The controlling boundary is: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

C:

“Action: Enable Salesforce as the identity provider and register the external service provider using supported SAML app configuration. Verification: Review integration user permission sets, requested scopes and negative authorization tests. Boundary: A JWT's signature alone does not authorize any user or resource outside the registered app and org policy” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments for a research group wants Salesforce users to open an independent SAML-enabled timesheet service without new credentials The controlling boundary is: Salesforce can issue trusted SAML assertions only for applications and subjects registered in its identity provider trust configuration.

Question 313

An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. Best next IAM response?

  1. Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins
  2. Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration
  3. Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior
  4. Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration” addresses the access-design responsibilities in an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity Test against verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; an OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

C:

“Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

D:

“Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Question 314

An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. Most decisive verification?

  1. Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments
  2. Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling
  3. Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange
  4. Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity It checks whether evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments” needs to be evaluated against An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

C:

“Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange” needs to be evaluated against An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

D:

“Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions” needs to be evaluated against An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Question 315

An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. Key caution for this case?

  1. IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent
  2. New connected app creation is restricted as of Spring 2026; an old exam-guide click path may no longer apply
  3. A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience
  4. An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” needs to be evaluated against An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” needs to be evaluated against An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

B:

“New connected app creation is restricted as of Spring 2026; an old exam-guide click path may no longer apply” needs to be evaluated against An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

C:

“A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience” needs to be evaluated against An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Question 316

An external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.
  2. Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.
  3. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.
  4. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” addresses the access-design responsibilities in an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity Test against verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; an OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

C:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

D:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for an external customer support service supports OIDC and needs users to authenticate using Salesforce as the source identity The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Question 317

A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. Best next IAM response?

  1. Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks
  2. Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior
  3. Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins
  4. Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing Test against verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; an OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

B:

“Prefer the supported external client app framework for new identity-provider integrations and preserve validated legacy app behavior” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

C:

“Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Question 318

A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. Most decisive verification?

  1. Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments
  2. Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions
  3. Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling
  4. Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing It checks whether evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Validate Salesforce IdP certificate, SP entity ID, ACS URL and authorized user assignments” needs to be evaluated against A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

B:

“Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions” needs to be evaluated against A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

D:

“Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange” needs to be evaluated against A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Question 319

A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. Key caution for this case?

  1. IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent
  2. A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience
  3. An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party
  4. New connected app creation is restricted as of Spring 2026; an old exam-guide click path may no longer apply

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” needs to be evaluated against A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” needs to be evaluated against A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

B:

“A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience” needs to be evaluated against A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

D:

“New connected app creation is restricted as of Spring 2026; an old exam-guide click path may no longer apply” needs to be evaluated against A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. The relevant check is Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Question 320

A reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.
  2. Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent.
  3. Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience.
  4. Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing Test against verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling; an OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Fix authorization-code redirect registration, state integrity and callback matching before widening trusted origins. Verification: Test allowed resources, user permission sets, sensitive fields and scope restrictions. Boundary: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

B:

“Action: Evaluate Salesforce as an OIDC provider for a compatible relying party with approved claims and client registration. Verification: Test code verifier/challenge, redirect registration, user grant and token exchange. Boundary: IdP-initiated and SP-initiated SAML have different request context and cannot be assumed equivalent” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

C:

“Action: Separate identity claims validation from API token handling and enforce correct issuer, audience and nonce checks. Verification: Verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling. Boundary: A valid Salesforce user session does not authorize a SAML assertion for an unrelated target audience” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish verify issuer discovery, token validation, audience, nonce and redirect URI handling for a reporting portal wants a signed OIDC ID token from a Salesforce identity provider rather than SOAP assertion processing The controlling boundary is: An OAuth API access token is not a substitute for validating an OIDC identity token at the relying party.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests