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Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 26

Question 250

A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. Most decisive verification?

  1. Test name or email changes against unchanged federation identifiers and audit links
  2. Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error
  3. Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases
  4. Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters It checks whether preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Test name or email changes against unchanged federation identifiers and audit links” needs to be evaluated against A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

B:

“Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error” needs to be evaluated against A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

C:

“Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases” needs to be evaluated against A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Question 251

A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. Key caution for this case?

  1. Reusing issuer configuration across unrelated IdPs can make intended authentication boundaries unclear
  2. A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population
  3. A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe
  4. Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe” needs to be evaluated against A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Reusing issuer configuration across unrelated IdPs can make intended authentication boundaries unclear” needs to be evaluated against A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

B:

“A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population” needs to be evaluated against A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

D:

“Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated” needs to be evaluated against A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Question 252

A user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Supply and validate all required user, profile and relationship attributes for the chosen JIT provisioning mode. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated.
  2. Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.
  3. Action: Implement a controlled authentication provider and registration handler mapping for the external customer population. Verification: Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.
  4. Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases. Boundary: A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters Test against review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; a successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Supply and validate all required user, profile and relationship attributes for the chosen JIT provisioning mode. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

C:

“Action: Implement a controlled authentication provider and registration handler mapping for the external customer population. Verification: Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

D:

“Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases. Boundary: A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a user enters through an IdP app tile and the returned RelayState is constructed from untrusted request parameters The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Question 253

A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. Best next IAM response?

  1. Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets
  2. Implement a controlled authentication provider and registration handler mapping for the external customer population
  3. Supply and validate all required user, profile and relationship attributes for the chosen JIT provisioning mode
  4. Use the supported Salesforce authentication-provider integration with claim validation and account registration mapping

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site Test against review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; a successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Implement a controlled authentication provider and registration handler mapping for the external customer population” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

C:

“Supply and validate all required user, profile and relationship attributes for the chosen JIT provisioning mode” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

D:

“Use the supported Salesforce authentication-provider integration with claim validation and account registration mapping” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Question 254

A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. Most decisive verification?

  1. Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases
  2. Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests
  3. Test name or email changes against unchanged federation identifiers and audit links
  4. Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site It checks whether preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases” needs to be evaluated against A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

C:

“Test name or email changes against unchanged federation identifiers and audit links” needs to be evaluated against A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

D:

“Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error” needs to be evaluated against A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Question 255

A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. Key caution for this case?

  1. A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe
  2. Reusing issuer configuration across unrelated IdPs can make intended authentication boundaries unclear
  3. Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated
  4. A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe” needs to be evaluated against A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Reusing issuer configuration across unrelated IdPs can make intended authentication boundaries unclear” needs to be evaluated against A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

C:

“Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated” needs to be evaluated against A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

D:

“A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population” needs to be evaluated against A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. The relevant check is Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Question 256

A partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Supply and validate all required user, profile and relationship attributes for the chosen JIT provisioning mode. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated.
  2. Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases. Boundary: A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population.
  3. Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.
  4. Action: Implement a controlled authentication provider and registration handler mapping for the external customer population. Verification: Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site Test against review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests; a successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Supply and validate all required user, profile and relationship attributes for the chosen JIT provisioning mode. Verification: Review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests. Boundary: Custom provisioning code can introduce elevated access or duplicate identities if claims are not validated” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

B:

“Action: Preserve approved destination state without accepting arbitrary external redirect targets. Verification: Validate accepted issuer IDs, signing keys, user identifiers and regional login test cases. Boundary: A provider's presence on a login page does not prove it is authorized for every account population” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

D:

“Action: Implement a controlled authentication provider and registration handler mapping for the external customer population. Verification: Compare Destination, AudienceRestriction, ACS, My Domain and the exact SAML error. Boundary: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish review RelayState handling, target allowlists, request correlation and open-redirect tests for a partner uses a deep link to Salesforce and the architect needs to preserve navigation without redirecting users outside an approved site The controlling boundary is: A successful SAML login does not make an unvalidated post-login destination safe.

Question 257

A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. Best next IAM response?

  1. Diagnose cryptographic trust using approved IdP metadata and correct certificate rotation
  2. Add an authoritative deprovisioning and session-revocation workflow independent of login-time JIT
  3. Use Salesforce Login History and available SAML diagnostic evidence to classify the failure before remediation
  4. Agree on an unambiguous NameID or federation identifier claim before accepting the identity

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Use Salesforce Login History and available SAML diagnostic evidence to classify the failure before remediation” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts Test against correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Diagnose cryptographic trust using approved IdP metadata and correct certificate rotation” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access for a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts The controlling boundary is: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

B:

“Add an authoritative deprovisioning and session-revocation workflow independent of login-time JIT” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access for a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts The controlling boundary is: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

D:

“Agree on an unambiguous NameID or federation identifier claim before accepting the identity” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access for a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts The controlling boundary is: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Question 258

A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. Most decisive verification?

  1. Inspect signed subject, unique mapping field, duplicate-name tests and account resolution logs
  2. Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access
  3. Check SAML attribute names, license and profile eligibility, linked contact/account and JIT error details
  4. Test trusted claims, contact matching, consent record and duplicate-registration failures

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts It checks whether use Salesforce Login History and available SAML diagnostic evidence to classify the failure before remediation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Inspect signed subject, unique mapping field, duplicate-name tests and account resolution logs” needs to be evaluated against A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. The relevant check is Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

C:

“Check SAML attribute names, license and profile eligibility, linked contact/account and JIT error details” needs to be evaluated against A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. The relevant check is Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

D:

“Test trusted claims, contact matching, consent record and duplicate-registration failures” needs to be evaluated against A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. The relevant check is Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Question 259

A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. Key caution for this case?

  1. Disabling temporal validation is not an acceptable workaround for clock-skew problems
  2. Moving password verification does not automatically migrate SAML trust, MFA assurance or local authorization
  3. Redirecting employees to SSO must not accidentally lock all administrators out of the org
  4. Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure” needs to be evaluated against A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. The relevant check is Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Disabling temporal validation is not an acceptable workaround for clock-skew problems” needs to be evaluated against A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. The relevant check is Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

B:

“Moving password verification does not automatically migrate SAML trust, MFA assurance or local authorization” needs to be evaluated against A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. The relevant check is Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

C:

“Redirecting employees to SSO must not accidentally lock all administrators out of the org” needs to be evaluated against A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. The relevant check is Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Question 260

A helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Add an authoritative deprovisioning and session-revocation workflow independent of login-time JIT. Verification: Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access. Boundary: Disabling temporal validation is not an acceptable workaround for clock-skew problems.
  2. Action: Agree on an unambiguous NameID or federation identifier claim before accepting the identity. Verification: Inspect signed subject, unique mapping field, duplicate-name tests and account resolution logs. Boundary: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.
  3. Action: Use Salesforce Login History and available SAML diagnostic evidence to classify the failure before remediation. Verification: Test trusted claims, contact matching, consent record and duplicate-registration failures. Boundary: Moving password verification does not automatically migrate SAML trust, MFA assurance or local authorization.
  4. Action: Use Salesforce Login History and available SAML diagnostic evidence to classify the failure before remediation. Verification: Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access. Boundary: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Action: Use Salesforce Login History and available SAML diagnostic evidence to classify the failure before remediation. Verification: Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access. Boundary: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts Test against correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access; retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Add an authoritative deprovisioning and session-revocation workflow independent of login-time JIT. Verification: Correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access. Boundary: Disabling temporal validation is not an acceptable workaround for clock-skew problems” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access for a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts The controlling boundary is: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

B:

“Action: Agree on an unambiguous NameID or federation identifier claim before accepting the identity. Verification: Inspect signed subject, unique mapping field, duplicate-name tests and account resolution logs. Boundary: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access for a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts The controlling boundary is: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

C:

“Action: Use Salesforce Login History and available SAML diagnostic evidence to classify the failure before remediation. Verification: Test trusted claims, contact matching, consent record and duplicate-registration failures. Boundary: Moving password verification does not automatically migrate SAML trust, MFA assurance or local authorization” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish correlate time, username, error code, assertion claims and IdP logs under authorized access for a helpdesk sees repeated Salesforce SSO failures only for recently onboarded accounts The controlling boundary is: Retrying login or resetting passwords may not resolve a federation trust or provisioning failure.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests