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Exam Code: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Exam Name: Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect

Certification Provider: Salesforce

Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Questions & Answers

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Salesforce Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Test 11

Question 100

A Salesforce service provider rejects signed SAML responses after the identity team reuses a metadata file from a different application. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Match the federation protocol to service-provider compatibility and security requirements instead of choosing one for every application. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior.
  2. Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Follow the login redirects, assertion issuer and target audience. Boundary: A branding or domain change can break authentication even when user credentials and permissions have not changed.
  3. Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.
  4. Action: Evaluate Just-in-Time user creation versus pre-provisioning based on lifecycle and entitlement needs. Verification: Examine NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, system time offsets and error logs. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a Salesforce service provider rejects signed SAML responses after the identity team reuses a metadata file from a different application Test against compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Match the federation protocol to service-provider compatibility and security requirements instead of choosing one for every application. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a Salesforce service provider rejects signed SAML responses after the identity team reuses a metadata file from a different application The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

B:

“Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Follow the login redirects, assertion issuer and target audience. Boundary: A branding or domain change can break authentication even when user credentials and permissions have not changed” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a Salesforce service provider rejects signed SAML responses after the identity team reuses a metadata file from a different application The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

D:

“Action: Evaluate Just-in-Time user creation versus pre-provisioning based on lifecycle and entitlement needs. Verification: Examine NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, system time offsets and error logs. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a Salesforce service provider rejects signed SAML responses after the identity team reuses a metadata file from a different application The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Question 101

A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. Best next IAM response?

  1. Match the federation protocol to service-provider compatibility and security requirements instead of choosing one for every application
  2. Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration
  3. Decouple trusted authentication from tenant-specific authorization and enforce scoped privileges after account matching
  4. Evaluate Just-in-Time user creation versus pre-provisioning based on lifecycle and entitlement needs

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider Test against compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Match the federation protocol to service-provider compatibility and security requirements instead of choosing one for every application” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

C:

“Decouple trusted authentication from tenant-specific authorization and enforce scoped privileges after account matching” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

D:

“Evaluate Just-in-Time user creation versus pre-provisioning based on lifecycle and entitlement needs” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Question 102

A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. Most decisive verification?

  1. Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata
  2. Examine NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, system time offsets and error logs
  3. Follow the login redirects, assertion issuer and target audience
  4. Validate tenant claims, user mapping, assigned permissions and unauthorized cross-tenant access tests

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider It checks whether validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Examine NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, system time offsets and error logs” needs to be evaluated against A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. The relevant check is Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

C:

“Follow the login redirects, assertion issuer and target audience” needs to be evaluated against A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. The relevant check is Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

D:

“Validate tenant claims, user mapping, assigned permissions and unauthorized cross-tenant access tests” needs to be evaluated against A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. The relevant check is Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Question 103

A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. Key caution for this case?

  1. A branding or domain change can break authentication even when user credentials and permissions have not changed
  2. Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable
  3. A signed message from an unknown issuer or the wrong audience must not automatically authenticate a Salesforce user
  4. Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable” needs to be evaluated against A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. The relevant check is Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“A branding or domain change can break authentication even when user credentials and permissions have not changed” needs to be evaluated against A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. The relevant check is Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

C:

“A signed message from an unknown issuer or the wrong audience must not automatically authenticate a Salesforce user” needs to be evaluated against A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. The relevant check is Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

D:

“Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior” needs to be evaluated against A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. The relevant check is Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Question 104

A financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.
  2. Action: Match the federation protocol to service-provider compatibility and security requirements instead of choosing one for every application. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior.
  3. Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Follow the login redirects, assertion issuer and target audience. Boundary: A branding or domain change can break authentication even when user credentials and permissions have not changed.
  4. Action: Evaluate Just-in-Time user creation versus pre-provisioning based on lifecycle and entitlement needs. Verification: Examine NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, system time offsets and error logs. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider Test against compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata; cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Action: Match the federation protocol to service-provider compatibility and security requirements instead of choosing one for every application. Verification: Compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata. Boundary: Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

C:

“Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Follow the login redirects, assertion issuer and target audience. Boundary: A branding or domain change can break authentication even when user credentials and permissions have not changed” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

D:

“Action: Evaluate Just-in-Time user creation versus pre-provisioning based on lifecycle and entitlement needs. Verification: Examine NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, system time offsets and error logs. Boundary: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish compare SAML audience and destination to the registered Salesforce service provider metadata for a financial portal receives a valid signed assertion that references another registered service provider The controlling boundary is: Cryptographic signature validity alone cannot make an assertion with the wrong audience acceptable.

Question 105

A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. Best next IAM response?

  1. Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings
  2. Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration
  3. Distinguish identity assertions from API authorization grants and use a suitable authenticated identity protocol when user login is required
  4. Select OIDC for identity assertions and OAuth authorization flows for scoped API access when supported by the participants

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

“Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce Test against check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; a successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Incorrect Answers

B:

“Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

C:

“Distinguish identity assertions from API authorization grants and use a suitable authenticated identity protocol when user login is required” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

D:

“Select OIDC for identity assertions and OAuth authorization flows for scoped API access when supported by the participants” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Question 106

A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. Most decisive verification?

  1. Validate supported SAML bindings, OIDC endpoints, signing trust and session lifecycle for each app
  2. Test first login, required attributes, inactive status, license assignment and onboarding delay
  3. Compare HR events, directory account changes, Salesforce active status and delayed sync recovery
  4. Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce It checks whether coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Validate supported SAML bindings, OIDC endpoints, signing trust and session lifecycle for each app” needs to be evaluated against A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

B:

“Test first login, required attributes, inactive status, license assignment and onboarding delay” needs to be evaluated against A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

C:

“Compare HR events, directory account changes, Salesforce active status and delayed sync recovery” needs to be evaluated against A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Question 107

A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. Key caution for this case?

  1. OIDC authentication and OAuth resource authorization solve related but different requirements
  2. Sign-in-triggered changes alone cannot guarantee off-session user lifecycle compliance
  3. A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key
  4. Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

“A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key” needs to be evaluated against A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“OIDC authentication and OAuth resource authorization solve related but different requirements” needs to be evaluated against A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

B:

“Sign-in-triggered changes alone cannot guarantee off-session user lifecycle compliance” needs to be evaluated against A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

D:

“Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior” needs to be evaluated against A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Question 108

A central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce. Best complete IAM decision record?

  1. Action: Distinguish identity assertions from API authorization grants and use a suitable authenticated identity protocol when user login is required. Verification: Test first login, required attributes, inactive status, license assignment and onboarding delay. Boundary: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.
  2. Action: Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings. Verification: Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path. Boundary: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.
  3. Action: Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings. Verification: Compare HR events, directory account changes, Salesforce active status and delayed sync recovery. Boundary: Sign-in-triggered changes alone cannot guarantee off-session user lifecycle compliance.
  4. Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path. Boundary: Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Action: Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings. Verification: Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path. Boundary: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key” addresses the access-design responsibilities in a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce Test against check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; a successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Action: Distinguish identity assertions from API authorization grants and use a suitable authenticated identity protocol when user login is required. Verification: Test first login, required attributes, inactive status, license assignment and onboarding delay. Boundary: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

C:

“Action: Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings. Verification: Compare HR events, directory account changes, Salesforce active status and delayed sync recovery. Boundary: Sign-in-triggered changes alone cannot guarantee off-session user lifecycle compliance” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

D:

“Action: Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration. Verification: Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path. Boundary: Different SAML initiation patterns cannot be assumed to produce identical request validation and RelayState behavior” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for a central identity provider rotates signing certificates and employees suddenly lose access to Salesforce The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Question 109

An acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window. Best next IAM response?

  1. Distinguish identity assertions from API authorization grants and use a suitable authenticated identity protocol when user login is required
  2. Select OIDC for identity assertions and OAuth authorization flows for scoped API access when supported by the participants
  3. Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration
  4. Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

“Coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings” addresses the access-design responsibilities in an acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window Test against check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; a successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Distinguish identity assertions from API authorization grants and use a suitable authenticated identity protocol when user login is required” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for an acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

B:

“Select OIDC for identity assertions and OAuth authorization flows for scoped API access when supported by the participants” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for an acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

C:

“Validate audience restriction, entity IDs, assertion recipient and ACS address as a matched trust configuration” may apply to a related identity task, but it does not establish check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path for an acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window The controlling boundary is: A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Question 110

An acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window. Most decisive verification?

  1. Test first login, required attributes, inactive status, license assignment and onboarding delay
  2. Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path
  3. Compare HR events, directory account changes, Salesforce active status and delayed sync recovery
  4. Validate supported SAML bindings, OIDC endpoints, signing trust and session lifecycle for each app

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

“Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path” distinguishes sign-in from entitlement administration in an acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window It checks whether coordinate trusted certificate rotation and test old/new key acceptance according to supported Salesforce settings.

Incorrect Answers

A:

“Test first login, required attributes, inactive status, license assignment and onboarding delay” needs to be evaluated against An acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

C:

“Compare HR events, directory account changes, Salesforce active status and delayed sync recovery” needs to be evaluated against An acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

D:

“Validate supported SAML bindings, OIDC endpoints, signing trust and session lifecycle for each app” needs to be evaluated against An acquired subsidiary switches its federation certificate without a coordinated rollover window. The relevant check is Check metadata update, active certificate fingerprint, error codes and rollback path; A successful identity-provider change does not guarantee relying applications automatically trust the replacement key.

Certified Platform Identity and Access Management Architect Practice Tests