Question 160
A reviewer challenges the following plan: A regulator requires proof that log forwarding continues during an internet link interruption. Which risk most directly threatens this requirement?
Explanation
Correct Answer
This assumption is unsafe because configuring a destination address does not prove retention during an outage. It directly threatens the requirement: A regulator requires proof that log forwarding continues during an internet link interruption. Confirm the relevant evidence—review log buffering, local collector alternatives, retry settings and forwarding monitoring—before selecting design bounded buffering and a documented recovery procedure for the logging architecture.
Incorrect Answers
The option applies in “A change manager wants incident notifications by email but also durable machine-readable SIEM ingestion”. Confirm the relevant evidence—compare SMTP notification use with API/HTTP or syslog integrations and reliability needs—before selecting use email for human alerts and structured supported log delivery for analytics ingestion. That evidence does not directly establish “Configuring a destination address does not prove retention during an outage” for the scenario at hand.
This can be appropriate when an external SOC requires encrypted syslog copies of firewall events but a team configures unencrypted transport, but it does not isolate the distinguishing requirement here: A regulator requires proof that log forwarding continues during an internet link interruption. The correct risk decision is configuring a destination address does not prove retention during an outage.
The distinct use case for this response is “A security team forwards every low-value event to three SIEMs and exceeds licensed logging egress capacity”. The design should document the corresponding investigation and practical acceptance evidence. The present case instead calls for “Configuring a destination address does not prove retention during an outage”.