Question 530
A security change aims to correct: An outbound proxy decrypts permitted sites but policy should reject unsupported obsolete TLS negotiation by clients. The chosen fix is apply supported minimum-protocol and cipher controls in the proper decryption profile and remediate incompatible clients. Which observed test result directly supports closing this change?
Explanation
Correct Answer
Acceptance requires evidence that modern test clients connect while deliberately obsolete negotiation is rejected in the intended policy scope. The original problem was: An outbound proxy decrypts permitted sites but policy should reject unsupported obsolete TLS negotiation by clients. The team applied the remedy to apply supported minimum-protocol and cipher controls in the proper decryption profile and remediate incompatible clients. This outcome checks the actual security or connectivity effect, including the intended scope, rather than only proving that the candidate configuration saved or that a push job reported completion.
Incorrect Answers
Banking category tests remain encrypted end to end while other eligible sites are decrypted as intended. That alternative is checked by confirming that place a narrowly scoped no-decrypt rule above the relevant decrypt policy for the approved category; the actual requirement instead calls for confirming that modern test clients connect while deliberately obsolete negotiation is rejected in the intended policy scope.
Controlled incoming TLS requests are inspected without breaking the server handshake. Confirming that provision authorized server credentials and applying the appropriate inbound decryption settings to the protected service tests that mechanism, but it does not establish the reported condition—an outbound proxy decrypts permitted sites but policy should reject unsupported obsolete TLS negotiation by clients.
The affected application succeeds with a trusted chain, and malformed or untrusted test chains remain blocked. Its technical evidence involves correcting the appropriate trusted certificate path or a narrowly justified exception without disabling verification globally. For the stated question, confirming that modern test clients connect while deliberately obsolete negotiation is rejected in the intended policy scope is the more relevant test.