Question 390
The deployment team is preparing a sign-off for: TLS decryption works for most browsers but an internal legacy client fails because its server certificate is untrusted. Which mistaken assumption should be rejected before approval?
Explanation
Correct Answer
The risky assumption is selecting an ignore-all-certificate-errors profile merely to silence one legacy connection issue. In this particular incident, tLS decryption works for most browsers but an internal legacy client fails because its server certificate is untrusted. The safer path is to examine decryption logs, certificate trust chain and configured Decryption profile certificate-check behavior and then, when verified, to correct the appropriate trusted certificate path or a narrowly justified exception without disabling verification globally. The risk statement matters because it would obscure the true mechanism, broaden permissions, or falsely certify that the required outcome had been achieved.
Incorrect Answers
Assuming the firewall can always decrypt inbound TLS using only the public server certificate. The check concerns assuming the firewall can always decrypt inbound TLS using only the public server certificate, not confirming that selecting an ignore-all-certificate-errors profile merely to silence one legacy connection issue.
Disabling decryption for all outbound HTTPS instead of honoring a narrowly documented exception. This assesses disabling decryption for all outbound HTTPS instead of honoring a narrowly documented exception; it does not determine the reported condition—TLS decryption works for most browsers but an internal legacy client fails because its server certificate is untrusted.
Exempting an entire partner network from decryption because one pinned endpoint fails. The case-specific requirement is confirming that selecting an ignore-all-certificate-errors profile merely to silence one legacy connection issue, which that option does not establish.