Question 260
An Azure SQL operations team investigates: A team enables TDE and incorrectly claims that queried sensitive columns can no longer be seen by SQL privileged users. Select TWO complementary answers: the targeted corrective action AND the evidence that verifies it.
Explanation
Correct Answers
The reported Azure SQL or SQL Server condition is: A team enables TDE and incorrectly claims that queried sensitive columns can no longer be seen by SQL privileged users. The specific supported administrative response is: Use Always Encrypted with supported clients and key storage for sensitive column data that should remain protected from the database engine where the workload requires it. The technical risk is: TDE alone leaves values visible to SQL administrators or query-processing paths, whereas client-side column encryption changes query support. Confirm the correction with: Client-side encryption tests show protected fields are not revealed as plaintext to unauthorized database administrators while approved clients can use them.
The acceptance evidence for this incident (A team enables TDE and incorrectly claims that queried sensitive columns can no longer be seen by SQL privileged users.) is: Client-side encryption tests show protected fields are not revealed as plaintext to unauthorized database administrators while approved clients can use them. It directly tests whether the remediation (Use Always Encrypted with supported clients and key storage for sensitive column data that should remain protected from the database engine where the workload requires it.) solves the specified issue, instead of proving an unrelated database control works.
Incorrect Answers
Sensitive data classification and discovery (2.3) would demonstrate or implement: The classification inventory identifies sensitive columns and its labels match approved data handling requirements. This choice can be useful for that problem, but it does not establish the Always encrypted column confidentiality (2.2) control being assessed here.
SQL database auditing and audit storage (2.3) addresses another technical failure: Audit events written only to a disposable or broadly writable destination may be lost or tampered with. This case instead tests Always encrypted column confidentiality (2.2); the choice measures or changes another part of the system.
Azure SQL firewall rule scoping (2.2) addresses another technical failure: Allowing every public Azure IP or all internet clients to connect widens access to the SQL endpoint unnecessarily. The required paired action and test concerns Always encrypted column confidentiality (2.2); a passing result for this alternative could leave that requirement unresolved.