Question 120
An AZ-801 historical administration case reports: A branch controller is stolen and responders cannot identify the potentially exposed accounts. Which TWO choices provide the technical correction and a supporting acceptance test? (Select TWO.)
Explanation
Correct Answers
For A branch controller is stolen and responders cannot identify the potentially exposed accounts, this action is the relevant response: Configure Read-Only Domain Controller password-replication allow and deny policies for branch users and validate cached credential scope. It reduces the risk that a compromised branch RODC can expose improperly cached privileged secrets if replication policy is overly broad.
This is an independent validation for the condition A branch controller is stolen and responders cannot identify the potentially exposed accounts. The expected result is: Credential-cache inspection shows only authorized branch identities cached and protected administrator accounts excluded.
Incorrect Answers
Domain controller hardening and ad delegation: Broad delegated rights and unrestricted domain controller logons can enable directory takeover or silent privilege escalation. That mechanism alone cannot establish Rodc password replication and branch safety for this question.
Protected users group and authentication restrictions: Legacy NTLM or credential caching dependencies can break sign-in, while leaving privileged accounts unprotected exposes reusable credentials. That may be useful independently, but the missing requirement here is Rodc password replication and branch safety.
Hybrid ad password policy and fine-grained rules: Weak or conflicting password policies can permit guessing attacks or lock out legitimate privileged identities unexpectedly. Here the decisive check is Rodc password replication and branch safety, not that separate capability.