Question 720
A Microsoft Azure administrator receives this requirement: An enterprise application requests a high-impact directory-wide application permission, and regular users try to grant the permission themselves. Which operating control most directly reduces this recurring risk?
Explanation
Correct Answer
This guardrail addresses admin consent for sensitive application permission: The requested high-privilege permission requires administrator consent and cannot be authorized by normal user consent. The prevention measure is: Require review and documented business purpose before granting tenant-wide application consent. A control in another subsystem would not prevent this specific recurrence.
Incorrect Answers
The protected application registration has not exposed an OAuth permission scope for the required delegated operation. “Version and review exposed API scopes so newly added privileges require explicit consent” would address that alternative cause, not the condition in this question: the requested high-privilege permission requires administrator consent and cannot be authorized by normal user consent.
“Audit app role assignments and test default-deny authorization paths during release reviews” responds to this separate finding: successful authentication does not establish application authorization; app roles and assignments are not enforced. This question instead needs “Require review and documented business purpose before granting tenant-wide application consent”, so the alternative does not meet the stated condition.
Secret-based automation ignores supported federated workload identity trust between the CI issuer and Entra. “Audit federation subject patterns to prevent arbitrary branches or repositories from assuming deployment roles” applies to that separate problem. The observed case is an enterprise application requests a high-impact directory-wide application permission, and regular users try to grant the permission themselves; choosing this alternative would address the wrong failure mode.