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Isaca CISM Bundle

Exam Code: CISM

Exam Name Certified Information Security Manager

Certification Provider: Isaca

Corresponding Certification: CISM

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Certified Information Security Manager (CISM) Practice Tests

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Isaca CISM Practice Test 74

Question 730

A security manager is briefing business leadership, the team learns that a ransomware event compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments. What management action should be prioritized to address this situation?

  1. Develop dependency-ordered recovery runbooks and verification steps.
  2. Design independently isolated recovery copies and access controls.
  3. Integrate data integrity validation into disaster recovery criteria.
  4. Establish segregated recovery identities and clean-room validation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Establish segregated recovery identities and clean-room validation. Recovery must not rely entirely on compromised trust boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

This approach addresses a different situation: An enterprise can restore a database but not reconnect the recovered app to identity services. The boundary it addresses is “not reconnect the recovered app to identity services”, while this case concerns “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

B:

A backup subject to the same failure may not support recovery. This solves “the same region and account as production infrastructure”; the stated issue is “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

C:

An accessible system can still contain corrupted or incomplete data. The deciding difference is “Integrate data integrity validation into disaster recovery criteria” versus “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

Question 731

During a control and risk oversight meeting, risk ownership must be assigned after reports that a ransomware event compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments. Which assignment provides appropriate accountability for the affected business risk?

  1. Make the technology recovery owner accountable for end-to-end service restoration.
  2. Assign infrastructure recovery management to protect backup independence.
  3. Make recovery leadership responsible for trusted restoration authorization.
  4. Assign application and data owners responsibility for recovered accuracy.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

Make recovery leadership responsible for trusted restoration authorization. Recovery must not rely entirely on compromised trust boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Make the technology recovery owner accountable for end-to-end service restoration. Its application is “not reconnect the recovered app to identity services”, not the need “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

B:

A backup subject to the same failure may not support recovery. That is a different operating condition from “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”: “the same region and account as production infrastructure”.

D:

An accessible system can still contain corrupted or incomplete data. The present requirement is “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”; “Assign application and data owners responsibility for recovered” is a distinct situation.

Question 732

In the next assurance review, the team has started remediation after finding that a ransomware event compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments. Which measurement would be most relevant for judging whether the exposure is reducing?

  1. Track validated failover duration versus approved RTO.
  2. Measure backup copies surviving realistic account and region compromise.
  3. Track restore tests that pass availability but fail reconciliation.
  4. Measure recovery paths dependent on compromised privileged accounts.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Measure recovery paths dependent on compromised privileged accounts. Recovery must not rely entirely on compromised trust boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Documented objectives require proven technical recovery capability. The present requirement is “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”; “RTO but last year's failover took eight hours” is a distinct situation.

B:

A backup subject to the same failure may not support recovery. That matters for “the same region and account as production infrastructure” rather than the condition “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

C:

An accessible system can still contain corrupted or incomplete data. The boundary it addresses is “Track restore tests that pass availability but fail”, while this case concerns “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

Question 733

At the next enterprise governance checkpoint, a control owner claims remediation is complete following reports that a ransomware event compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments. Which evidence would best substantiate whether the intended management outcome is actually achieved?

  1. Compare recovered ledgers and transaction controls after restoration.
  2. Test break-glass recovery with independently controlled credentials.
  3. Test recovery using an isolated copy under loss of the primary environment.
  4. Repeat timed end-to-end failover with dependent applications.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Test break-glass recovery with independently controlled credentials. Recovery must not rely entirely on compromised trust boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An accessible system can still contain corrupted or incomplete data. This solves “Compare recovered ledgers and transaction controls after restoration”; the stated issue is “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

C:

A backup subject to the same failure may not support recovery. Its application is “the same region and account as production infrastructure”, not the need “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

D:

Documented objectives require proven technical recovery capability. That is a different operating condition from “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”: “RTO but last year's failover took eight hours”.

Question 734

During an enterprise security review, executives are reviewing a material concern: A ransomware event compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments. What should the security manager elevate when decision-makers review this matter?

  1. Report data-integrity risk separately from server uptime.
  2. Escalate recovery-environment compromise risk to crisis management.
  3. Escalate shared-fate backup risks and additional recovery investment.
  4. Report that restoring data alone does not restore the business service.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Escalate recovery-environment compromise risk to crisis management. Recovery must not rely entirely on compromised trust boundaries.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An accessible system can still contain corrupted or incomplete data. That is a different operating condition from “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”: “Report data-integrity risk separately from server uptime”.

C:

A backup subject to the same failure may not support recovery. The present requirement is “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”; “the same region and account as production infrastructure” is a distinct situation.

D:

Report that restoring data alone does not restore the business service. That matters for “not reconnect the recovered app to identity services” rather than the condition “compromises identity administrators with access to recovery environments”.

Question 735

In the next assurance review, the team learns that a phishing report involving executive credentials is incorrectly categorized as low impact because no malware was seen. What management action should be prioritized to address this situation?

  1. Classify incidents using identity sensitivity and business consequences.
  2. Differentiate security events from incidents based on observed impact and risk.
  3. Apply safety-aware incident severity thresholds.
  4. Adopt consistent information security incident classification criteria.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Classify incidents using identity sensitivity and business consequences. Incident severity considers potential loss, not just malware indicators.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Not every security event merits crisis-level response. The boundary it addresses is “every blocked phishing email as a major incident”, while this case concerns “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

C:

High-consequence safety impact can justify immediate severity escalation. This solves “a generic IT outage despite potential safety consequences”; the stated issue is “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

D:

Common categorization supports comparability and timely escalation. The deciding difference is “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak” versus “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

Question 736

At the next enterprise governance checkpoint, risk ownership must be assigned after reports that a phishing report involving executive credentials is incorrectly categorized as low impact because no malware was seen. Which assignment provides appropriate accountability for the affected business risk?

  1. Make incident triage leadership accountable for consistent thresholds.
  2. Make incident command responsible for severity escalation criteria.
  3. Make enterprise response governance responsible for category definitions.
  4. Make plant incident leadership accountable for safety-triggered escalation.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Make incident command responsible for severity escalation criteria. Incident severity considers potential loss, not just malware indicators.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not every security event merits crisis-level response. The deciding difference is “every blocked phishing email as a major incident” versus “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

C:

Common categorization supports comparability and timely escalation. That is a different operating condition from “as low impact because no malware was seen”: “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak”.

D:

High-consequence safety impact can justify immediate severity escalation. It serves “a generic IT outage despite potential safety consequences”, not “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

Question 737

During an enterprise security review, the team has started remediation after finding that a phishing report involving executive credentials is incorrectly categorized as low impact because no malware was seen. Which measurement would be most relevant for judging whether the exposure is reducing?

  1. Track safety-impacting incidents without senior operations involvement.
  2. Track high-risk credential cases downgraded without justification.
  3. Track false major-incident declarations and resource diversion.
  4. Measure classification disagreements across regions.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Track high-risk credential cases downgraded without justification. Incident severity considers potential loss, not just malware indicators.

Incorrect Answers

A:

High-consequence safety impact can justify immediate severity escalation. It serves “a generic IT outage despite potential safety consequences”, not “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

C:

Not every security event merits crisis-level response. That matters for “every blocked phishing email as a major incident” rather than the condition “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

D:

Common categorization supports comparability and timely escalation. The boundary it addresses is “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak”, while this case concerns “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

Question 738

A security manager is briefing business leadership, a control owner claims remediation is complete following reports that a phishing report involving executive credentials is incorrectly categorized as low impact because no malware was seen. Which evidence would best substantiate whether the intended management outcome is actually achieved?

  1. Run shared classification exercises on representative cases.
  2. Review account privileges and business impact in sampled incidents.
  3. Audit event-to-incident promotion using evidence and classification rules.
  4. Evaluate response logs against industrial safety severity criteria.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

Review account privileges and business impact in sampled incidents. Incident severity considers potential loss, not just malware indicators.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Common categorization supports comparability and timely escalation. The boundary it addresses is “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak”, while this case concerns “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

C:

Not every security event merits crisis-level response. The deciding difference is “every blocked phishing email as a major incident” versus “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

D:

High-consequence safety impact can justify immediate severity escalation. Its application is “a generic IT outage despite potential safety consequences”, not the need “as low impact because no malware was seen”.

Question 739

During a control and risk oversight meeting, executives are reviewing a material concern: A phishing report involving executive credentials is incorrectly categorized as low impact because no malware was seen. What should the security manager elevate when decision-makers review this matter?

  1. Report misclassification that delays protective action.
  2. Escalate inaccurate reporting and inconsistent regulatory triggers.
  3. Report triage overload and missed true incidents.
  4. Report the operational hazard and required incident command changes.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

Report misclassification that delays protective action. Incident severity considers potential loss, not just malware indicators.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Common categorization supports comparability and timely escalation. That is a different operating condition from “no malware was seen”: “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak”.

C:

Not every security event merits crisis-level response. It serves “every blocked phishing email as a major incident”, not “no malware was seen”.

D:

High-consequence safety impact can justify immediate severity escalation. The present requirement is “no malware was seen”; “a generic IT outage despite potential safety consequences” is a distinct situation.

Question 740

A security manager is briefing business leadership, the team learns that several regional SOCs assign different labels to the same customer-data leak. What management action should be prioritized to address this situation?

  1. Differentiate security events from incidents based on observed impact and risk.
  2. Classify incidents using identity sensitivity and business consequences.
  3. Apply safety-aware incident severity thresholds.
  4. Adopt consistent information security incident classification criteria.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

Adopt consistent information security incident classification criteria. Common categorization supports comparability and timely escalation.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Not every security event merits crisis-level response. The present requirement is “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak”; “every blocked phishing email as a major incident” is a distinct situation.

B:

Incident severity considers potential loss, not just malware indicators. That matters for “as low impact because no malware was seen” rather than the condition “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak”.

C:

High-consequence safety impact can justify immediate severity escalation. The boundary it addresses is “a generic IT outage despite potential safety consequences”, while this case concerns “assign different labels to the same customer-data leak”.