Question 320
A Linux administrator evaluates: A security policy requires events from one sensitive directory without overwhelming disks with unrelated debug logs. Select TWO complementary answers: the most suitable corrective action AND the evidence proving it worked.
Explanation
Correct Answers
For the specific observation (A security policy requires events from one sensitive directory without overwhelming disks with unrelated debug logs), the acceptance evidence is: A controlled policy event has the intended principal, action, timestamp and searchable retained record. This verifies the action (Configure narrowly scoped auditd rules and journal or rsyslog retention for security-relevant events, then verify collection.) rather than merely proving that an unrelated Linux tool works. It also addresses the known risk: An uncollected privileged action or volatile journal cannot provide reliable post-incident accountability evidence.
The observed Linux condition is: A security policy requires events from one sensitive directory without overwhelming disks with unrelated debug logs. The recommended direct administrative response is: Configure narrowly scoped auditd rules and journal or rsyslog retention for security-relevant events, then verify collection. The relevant failure or security risk is: An uncollected privileged action or volatile journal cannot provide reliable post-incident accountability evidence. Validate success with: A controlled policy event has the intended principal, action, timestamp and searchable retained record.
Incorrect Answers
Password aging and inactive account enforcement (3.4) would demonstrate or implement: Accounts that never expire or continue authenticating after offboarding create persistent unauthorized access risk. This choice can be useful for that problem, but it does not establish the Linux audit trails with auditd and journalctl control being assessed here.
LUKS2 full-volume encryption and key recovery (3.5) addresses another technical failure: A volume encrypted without safely recoverable key material can remain permanently inaccessible after host loss. The required paired action and test concerns Linux audit trails with auditd and journalctl; a passing result for this alternative could leave that requirement unresolved.
MFA and restricted service identity practices (3.4) would demonstrate or implement: A privileged login exercises the required additional factor while the service identity cannot initiate an interactive shell. The paired-answer requirement concerns Linux audit trails with auditd and journalctl; this alternative does not provide the matching intervention and separate acceptance evidence.