mcAfee Secure Website
23

Cisco 300-420 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

300-420 Training Materials $25.00

Reliable & Actual Study Materials for 300-420 Exam Success

The Latest 300-420 Exam Questions as Experienced in the Actual Test!

  • 24
    Questions & Answers

    300-420 Questions & Answers

    416 Questions & Answers

    Includes questions types found on actual exam such as drag and drop, simulation, type in, and fill in the blank.

  • 25
    300-420 Video Course

    300-420 Training Course

    75 Video Lectures

    Based on Real Life Scenarios which you will encounter in exam and learn by working with real equipment.

exam =32

Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD) (300-420) Practice Tests

Guarantee

Satisfaction Guaranteed

Pass4sure has a remarkable Cisco Candidate Success record. We're confident of our products and provide no hassle product exchange. That's how confident we are!

99.3% Pass Rate
Total Cost: $164.98
Bundle Price: $139.98

Purchase Individually

  • exam =34
    Questions & Answers

    Questions & Answers

    416 Questions

    $124.99
    exam =35
  • exam =37
    300-420 Video Course

    Training Course

    75 Video Lectures

    $39.99

Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 37

Question 360

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: Two redundant campus borders advertise the same summary but only one border has reachability to the specific server block after an internal partition. What design assurance control should be institutionalized?

  1. Include reverse-path verification in campus security zone design and ECMP changes.
  2. Establish timer and session-count budgets per platform before promising uniform subsecond convergence.
  3. Test partial reachability failures, not only complete router outages, when validating multicampus route policy.
  4. Audit shared services route leaks and ACLs together after each tenant or service onboarding.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This design guardrail addresses border route aggregation blackhole case: A summary advertised by a border without valid components can attract and blackhole traffic during partial network failures. Long-term prevention is: Test partial reachability failures, not only complete router outages, when validating multicampus route policy. A generic control for another failure mode is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Stateful inspection needs coherent bidirectional flow visibility, while independent routing cost choices can create asymmetric paths. “Include reverse-path verification in campus security zone design and ECMP changes” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: a summary advertised by a border without valid components can attract and blackhole traffic during partial network failures.

B:

“Establish timer and session-count budgets per platform before promising uniform subsecond convergence” is the supported response when high session counts and excessively aggressive timers can exhaust control resources and cause false routing flaps. Here the decisive response is “Test partial reachability failures, not only complete router outages, when validating multicampus route policy”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Unfiltered inter-VRF route leaking can undermine segmentation even if each tenant has its own routing instance. “Audit shared services route leaks and ACLs together after each tenant or service onboarding” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is two redundant campus borders advertise the same summary but only one border has reachability to the specific server block after an internal partition; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 361

An enterprise network design must address this condition: A site-to-site tunnel negotiates successfully but finance traffic fails because protected subnet traffic selectors exclude one new destination prefix. What is the most appropriate architecture or policy correction?

  1. Design redundant supported SD-WAN Managers with backup, RBAC and regional management reachability as appropriate.
  2. Evaluate supported GET VPN group key distribution and policy design where technology and business requirements fit.
  3. Update both peers' protected prefix definitions and routing design with least-privilege permitted flows.
  4. Budget tunnel overhead, validate tunnel MTU/MSS adjustment and preserve necessary ICMP feedback.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The design gap is: VPN session status can be healthy while mismatched crypto ACLs or traffic selectors omit the application flow. The recommended correction is: Update both peers' protected prefix definitions and routing design with least-privilege permitted flows. Validate it through: A controlled finance packet matches an appropriate IPsec SA and other unapproved subnets remain outside the tunnel.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change concerns cisco sd wan management plane resilience, where Management availability and existing data-plane forwarding have different dependencies, while loss of manageability remains an operational risk. The reported issue instead stems from: VPN session status can be healthy while mismatched crypto ACLs or traffic selectors omit the application flow.

B:

That change concerns get vpn any to any encryption, where Traditional point-to-point encryption tunnel meshes may add unnecessary topology and scale complexity for a trusted private routed underlay. In this question the necessary remedy is “Update both peers' protected prefix definitions and routing design with least-privilege permitted flows”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns gre tunnel mtu and fragmentation, where Encapsulation and encryption overhead reduce effective path MTU, and missing PMTUD control messages can stall large packets. The observed condition is a site-to-site tunnel negotiates successfully but finance traffic fails because protected subnet traffic selectors exclude one new destination prefix; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 362

A network engineering team compares alternatives after discovering: An edge device has two BGP paths to the same prefix but operators expect load sharing merely because both routes appear in the neighbor table. Which design decision resolves the stated requirement?

  1. Evaluate path attributes and supported multipath settings, then choose a design that preserves deterministic failover.
  2. Standardize supported wide-metric design and audit interface cost policies across participating IS-IS devices.
  3. Tag routes with an approved community scheme and enforce explicit export policy at each boundary.
  4. Use a supported IPv6-over-IPv4 tunnel with correct endpoint reachability, encapsulation security and effective MTU.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The design gap is: BGP additional paths must satisfy supported multipath eligibility rules and configured maximum-path policy to share traffic. The recommended correction is: Evaluate path attributes and supported multipath settings, then choose a design that preserves deterministic failover. Validate it through: The forwarding table contains the intended eligible next hops and multiple flows distribute without unintended packet duplication.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change concerns is-is wide metric consistency, where Mixed or unsuitable metric styles can undermine consistent path-cost planning and overflow the intended metric range. The reported issue instead stems from: BGP additional paths must satisfy supported multipath eligibility rules and configured maximum-path policy to share traffic.

C:

That change concerns BGP community-based export policy, where Manual per-prefix policy misses newly onboarded routes when attributes and export rules are not centrally classified. In this question the necessary remedy is “Evaluate path attributes and supported multipath settings, then choose a design that preserves deterministic failover”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns ipv6 gre overlay across ipv4 underlay, where An IPv4-only underlay cannot natively carry IPv6 forwarding without an overlay or other transition capability. The observed condition is an edge device has two BGP paths to the same prefix but operators expect load sharing merely because both routes appear in the neighbor table; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 363

A regional network architect receives this requirement: A national enterprise must collect interface statistics from routers supplied by three vendors, but a developer builds everything against one Cisco-proprietary YANG path. Which underlying design principle best explains this result?

  1. Vendor-native data models may expose platform-specific schema that cannot be queried identically across different vendors.
  2. Standardized models do not necessarily represent every vendor-specific operational or configuration feature.
  3. NETCONF can expose candidate datastores, locking and commit operations where supported, unlike assuming every management interface has equivalent transactions.
  4. OpenConfig provides vendor-neutral model definitions whose implemented paths and capabilities must still be validated per platform.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The relevant principle is: Vendor-native data models may expose platform-specific schema that cannot be queried identically across different vendors. A valid architectural response is: Prefer a suitable standards-based IETF model for portable interface telemetry, documenting implementation gaps and vendor extensions. The expected evidence is: The same intended interface counters are available across eligible vendors through mapped interoperable model paths.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Standardized models do not necessarily represent every vendor-specific operational or configuration feature. “Use the supported Cisco native YANG model for the particular feature with platform and software-version capability checks” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: vendor-native data models may expose platform-specific schema that cannot be queried identically across different vendors.

C:

“Design a supported NETCONF workflow with lock, edit-config, validate, commit and rollback handling for the device capabilities” is the supported response when NETCONF can expose candidate datastores, locking and commit operations where supported, unlike assuming every management interface has equivalent transactions. Here the decisive response is “Prefer a suitable standards-based IETF model for portable interface telemetry, documenting implementation gaps and vendor extensions”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

OpenConfig provides vendor-neutral model definitions whose implemented paths and capabilities must still be validated per platform. “Select supported OpenConfig telemetry modules, verify revisions and normalize exceptions without assuming universal coverage” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a national enterprise must collect interface statistics from routers supplied by three vendors, but a developer builds everything against one Cisco-proprietary YANG path; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 364

A large enterprise is evaluating this design decision: An organization classifies applications by payload signatures inside IPsec tunnels and then finds all encrypted business traffic mapped to a single generic class. Which underlying design principle best explains this result?

  1. Random early detection is usually better aligned with responsive TCP queues than with high-priority delay-sensitive voice traffic.
  2. Priority queuing alone cannot create bandwidth beyond circuit capacity, and too many concurrent sessions can oversubscribe voice allocation.
  3. Encryption hides much application payload from intermediate classifiers, so deep packet inspection may not see per-app content inside the tunnel.
  4. Without class-based queue service, different traffic priorities may compete equally under congestion rather than receiving guaranteed minimum allocations.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The relevant principle is: Encryption hides much application payload from intermediate classifiers, so deep packet inspection may not see per-app content inside the tunnel. A valid architectural response is: Classify and mark before encryption or use supported trusted tunnel metadata and policy-based identification at appropriate endpoints. The expected evidence is: Protected traffic reaches intended QoS queues despite encryption and unauthorized markings cannot bypass access policy.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Random early detection is usually better aligned with responsive TCP queues than with high-priority delay-sensitive voice traffic. “Use appropriate congestion avoidance on suitable best-effort TCP classes and protect voice through controlled priority service” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: encryption hides much application payload from intermediate classifiers, so deep packet inspection may not see per-app content inside the tunnel.

B:

“Design call admission or session limits based on codec overhead and failover bandwidth, with controlled class policies” is the supported response when priority queuing alone cannot create bandwidth beyond circuit capacity, and too many concurrent sessions can oversubscribe voice allocation. Here the decisive response is “Classify and mark before encryption or use supported trusted tunnel metadata and policy-based identification at appropriate endpoints”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Without class-based queue service, different traffic priorities may compete equally under congestion rather than receiving guaranteed minimum allocations. “Implement appropriate CBWFQ or platform-supported scheduler weights after classifying actual traffic” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is an organization classifies applications by payload signatures inside IPsec tunnels and then finds all encrypted business traffic mapped to a single generic class; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 365

A large enterprise is evaluating this design decision: A branch marks a critical application with DSCP 46, but the MPLS provider maps it into ordinary treatment because service-class translation was never agreed. Which design decision resolves the stated requirement?

  1. Negotiate and implement DSCP-to-provider-CoS mapping and verify marking at each trust boundary.
  2. Reserve suitable queue and burst tolerance based on codec behavior, media priority and empirically observed peak load.
  3. Design call admission or session limits based on codec overhead and failover bandwidth, with controlled class policies.
  4. Classify and mark before encryption or use supported trusted tunnel metadata and policy-based identification at appropriate endpoints.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The design gap is: DSCP semantics and provider class-of-service mappings are not necessarily preserved across an independent administrative domain. The recommended correction is: Negotiate and implement DSCP-to-provider-CoS mapping and verify marking at each trust boundary. Validate it through: Packets retain the intended service treatment end to end with measurable queue and latency performance on carrier circuits.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change concerns video traffic burst and jitter buffer design, where Average throughput can hide instantaneous bursts and delay variation that disrupt real-time media even when link utilization seems moderate. The reported issue instead stems from: DSCP semantics and provider class-of-service mappings are not necessarily preserved across an independent administrative domain.

C:

That change concerns call admission and voice capacity, where Priority queuing alone cannot create bandwidth beyond circuit capacity, and too many concurrent sessions can oversubscribe voice allocation. In this question the necessary remedy is “Negotiate and implement DSCP-to-provider-CoS mapping and verify marking at each trust boundary”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns qos classification encrypted traffic, where Encryption hides much application payload from intermediate classifiers, so deep packet inspection may not see per-app content inside the tunnel. The observed condition is a branch marks a critical application with DSCP 46, but the MPLS provider maps it into ordinary treatment because service-class translation was never agreed; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 366

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: A campus plans an ordinary IPv4 /27 for a voice VLAN with seventy active phones and expects enough usable addresses after adding a default gateway. Which measured observation confirms the intended architecture?

  1. Both intended /16 destinations use valid summaries while test addresses outside the owned ranges are not falsely advertised.
  2. Applications in both sites reach their intended peers without ambiguous next-hop selection, and tests confirm no accidental cross-tenant translation.
  3. Regional routing tables contain the intended regional summaries, branch prefixes remain unique and simulated additions do not require redesign of peer regions.
  4. An address-capacity calculation supports all phones plus gateway, and address allocation tests show no unexpected lease exhaustion.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This directly validates vlsm sized campus user allocation: An IPv4 /27 ordinarily has only thirty usable host addresses, so it cannot accommodate the stated phones and gateway. The linked design intervention is: Allocate a suitably sized /25 or larger subnet after accounting for network, broadcast, gateway and expected device growth. Results concerning another subsystem do not prove this requirement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

A /15 covers two consecutive aligned /16 networks and the selected /15 omits 10.66.0.0/16 while including unintended space. “Create aligned aggregates that cover actual component prefixes and validate binary prefix boundaries and the destination routing behavior” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: an IPv4 /27 ordinarily has only thirty usable host addresses, so it cannot accommodate the stated phones and gateway.

B:

“Choose a phased renumbering design or carefully scoped NAT between the overlapping domains with clear DNS and application dependencies” is the supported response when overlapping address spaces are ambiguous to ordinary destination-based routing and require unique addressing or deliberate translation boundaries. Here the decisive response is “Allocate a suitably sized /25 or larger subnet after accounting for network, broadcast, gateway and expected device growth”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

C:

Randomly scattered branch subnets prevent region-level summarization and make routing and change control unnecessarily complex. “Reserve contiguous region-sized address blocks, allocate branch VLSM prefixes inside each block and summarize only reachable ranges at distribution boundaries” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a campus plans an ordinary IPv4 /27 for a voice VLAN with seventy active phones and expects enough usable addresses after adding a default gateway; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 367

An enterprise network design must address this condition: A branch BGP edge learns a public provider default plus private corporate specifics and accidentally advertises internal /24s back to the provider. What governance check would most directly reduce future risk?

  1. Require prefix allocation consistency before EIGRP summarization is enabled in production.
  2. Capacity-plan BFD session counts and monitor instability before enabling aggressive timers across large deployments.
  3. Perform automated prefix allowlist tests and route-leak simulations before modifying BGP transit peers.
  4. Document OSPF network-type assumptions and test peer compatibility during link-provider migrations.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This design guardrail addresses BGP prefix filter outbound boundary: Unrestricted BGP export policy exposes destinations not authorized for upstream announcement and risks routing leaks. Long-term prevention is: Perform automated prefix allowlist tests and route-leak simulations before modifying BGP transit peers. A generic control for another failure mode is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Unnecessary specific-route propagation increases state and change sensitivity without providing required central policy detail. “Require prefix allocation consistency before EIGRP summarization is enabled in production” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: unrestricted BGP export policy exposes destinations not authorized for upstream announcement and risks routing leaks.

B:

“Capacity-plan BFD session counts and monitor instability before enabling aggressive timers across large deployments” is the supported response when layer 1 carrier state may not reveal a downstream path failure and slow neighbor detection extends blackhole time. Here the decisive response is “Perform automated prefix allowlist tests and route-leak simulations before modifying BGP transit peers”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Default broadcast OSPF network behavior can elect designated routers even when the topology is only a two-router link. “Document OSPF network-type assumptions and test peer compatibility during link-provider migrations” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a branch BGP edge learns a public provider default plus private corporate specifics and accidentally advertises internal /24s back to the provider; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 368

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: An access switch connected to a third-party tenant device begins sending superior BPDUs and causes the building's STP root to move into the tenant network. What design assurance control should be institutionalized?

  1. Version MST configuration centrally and test cross-building changes before enabling additional VLANs.
  2. Inspect fiber and BPDU loss diagnostics during campus convergence design reviews.
  3. Separate trusted infrastructure trunk roles from untrusted tenant-facing links in STP templates.
  4. Include VLAN-count forecasts in campus Layer 2 architecture capacity planning.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This design guardrail addresses stp root guard toward untrusted switch: Superior BPDUs on an untrusted downstream link can alter STP root selection unless the boundary is protected. Long-term prevention is: Separate trusted infrastructure trunk roles from untrusted tenant-facing links in STP templates. A generic control for another failure mode is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

A:

MST region membership requires consistent region identifier, revision and VLAN mapping rather than matching only some VLAN names. “Version MST configuration centrally and test cross-building changes before enabling additional VLANs” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: superior BPDUs on an untrusted downstream link can alter STP root selection unless the boundary is protected.

B:

“Inspect fiber and BPDU loss diagnostics during campus convergence design reviews” is the supported response when a non-designated STP port losing expected control messages can create a loop if it incorrectly assumes the superior path vanished. Here the decisive response is “Separate trusted infrastructure trunk roles from untrusted tenant-facing links in STP templates”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

A per-VLAN spanning-tree model scales protocol state with VLAN count and may become less efficient than suitable aggregated instances. “Include VLAN-count forecasts in campus Layer 2 architecture capacity planning” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is an access switch connected to a third-party tenant device begins sending superior BPDUs and causes the building's STP root to move into the tenant network; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 369

A large enterprise is evaluating this design decision: A newly connected access switch is routed to the fabric core but attached endpoints never receive the expected overlay segmentation because the device is not operating as a fabric edge. Which technical constraint explains these observations?

  1. Ordinary underlay reachability does not assign endpoint onboarding and VXLAN edge functions to a nonfabric access device.
  2. Superior BPDUs on an untrusted downstream link can alter STP root selection unless the boundary is protected.
  3. A fabric control plane supplies locator information, while the data plane uses supported VXLAN encapsulation to carry endpoint traffic.
  4. Fabric overlay endpoints require a suitable border function to exchange external route reachability with nonfabric networks.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The relevant principle is: Ordinary underlay reachability does not assign endpoint onboarding and VXLAN edge functions to a nonfabric access device. A valid architectural response is: Provision eligible access devices as supported fabric edge nodes and verify host onboarding and virtual network assignments. The expected evidence is: Attached endpoints receive the intended network and policy identifiers and are reachable through authorized fabric paths.

Incorrect Answers

B:

Superior BPDUs on an untrusted downstream link can alter STP root selection unless the boundary is protected. “Enable Root Guard on appropriate downstream designated ports and keep intended root roles explicit” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: ordinary underlay reachability does not assign endpoint onboarding and VXLAN edge functions to a nonfabric access device.

C:

“Design overlay forwarding paths with validated VXLAN reachability, fabric edge encapsulation and proper transport MTU” is the supported response when a fabric control plane supplies locator information, while the data plane uses supported VXLAN encapsulation to carry endpoint traffic. Here the decisive response is “Provision eligible access devices as supported fabric edge nodes and verify host onboarding and virtual network assignments”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Fabric overlay endpoints require a suitable border function to exchange external route reachability with nonfabric networks. “Select appropriate fabric border nodes and external routing policy matching the site's transit and segmentation needs” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a newly connected access switch is routed to the fabric core but attached endpoints never receive the expected overlay segmentation because the device is not operating as a fabric edge; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 370

An enterprise network design must address this condition: A new SD-Access fabric edge can reach control nodes by IP but VXLAN user traffic fails because the routed underlay path has insufficient MTU. Which measured observation confirms the intended architecture?

  1. Attached endpoints receive the intended network and policy identifiers and are reachable through authorized fabric paths.
  2. Fabric endpoints reach permitted enterprise destinations through the correct border while disallowed zones remain isolated.
  3. Test user packets arrive on the correct remote fabric edge through VXLAN after successful endpoint mapping.
  4. Large encapsulated endpoint flows pass while underlay routing reconverges on a tested link failure.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This directly validates sd access underlay mtu and ip reachability: Fabric overlay encapsulation adds overhead beyond ordinary IP reachability and depends on a healthy L3 underlay. The linked design intervention is: Provide resilient IP underlay reachability and adequate end-to-end MTU for supported fabric encapsulation. Results concerning another subsystem do not prove this requirement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Ordinary underlay reachability does not assign endpoint onboarding and VXLAN edge functions to a nonfabric access device. “Provision eligible access devices as supported fabric edge nodes and verify host onboarding and virtual network assignments” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: fabric overlay encapsulation adds overhead beyond ordinary IP reachability and depends on a healthy L3 underlay.

B:

“Select appropriate fabric border nodes and external routing policy matching the site's transit and segmentation needs” is the supported response when fabric overlay endpoints require a suitable border function to exchange external route reachability with nonfabric networks. Here the decisive response is “Provide resilient IP underlay reachability and adequate end-to-end MTU for supported fabric encapsulation”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

C:

A fabric control plane supplies locator information, while the data plane uses supported VXLAN encapsulation to carry endpoint traffic. “Design overlay forwarding paths with validated VXLAN reachability, fabric edge encapsulation and proper transport MTU” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a new SD-Access fabric edge can reach control nodes by IP but VXLAN user traffic fails because the routed underlay path has insufficient MTU; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.