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Cisco 300-420 Bundle

Exam Code: 300-420

Exam Name Designing Cisco Enterprise Networks (ENSLD)

Certification Provider: Cisco

Corresponding Certification: CCNP Enterprise

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Cisco 300-420 Practice Test 17

Question 160

An enterprise network design must address this condition: A financial institution wants dedicated provider L3VPN connectivity to cloud private resources and proposes exporting every enterprise VRF into one common cloud virtual network. What design assurance control should be institutionalized?

  1. Document analytics cadence requirements before selecting telemetry subscription mode.
  2. Review provider location and device diversity rather than treating two logical virtual interfaces as two physical links.
  3. Audit cloud gateway, route-target and BGP export policy at each new private cloud interconnect.
  4. Monitor certificate expiration and automate approved renewal across telemetry collectors and devices.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This design guardrail addresses mpls direct cloud provider integration: Private transport does not automatically enforce tenant segmentation or prevent unintended route exchange into cloud environments. Long-term prevention is: Audit cloud gateway, route-target and BGP export policy at each new private cloud interconnect. A generic control for another failure mode is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

A:

On-change subscriptions report eligible state changes, not necessarily uniformly spaced observations required for some time-series analytics. “Document analytics cadence requirements before selecting telemetry subscription mode” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: private transport does not automatically enforce tenant segmentation or prevent unintended route exchange into cloud environments.

B:

“Review provider location and device diversity rather than treating two logical virtual interfaces as two physical links” is the supported response when logical network separation on one physical direct-connect facility does not eliminate common power, provider or meet-me-room failures. Here the decisive response is “Audit cloud gateway, route-target and BGP export policy at each new private cloud interconnect”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

TLS mutual authentication depends on valid identity and trust configuration, independent of basic network reachability. “Monitor certificate expiration and automate approved renewal across telemetry collectors and devices” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a financial institution wants dedicated provider L3VPN connectivity to cloud private resources and proposes exporting every enterprise VRF into one common cloud virtual network; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 161

During acceptance of a proposed enterprise topology, the reviewers observe: A new branch has functioning encrypted transport tunnels but receives no remote service routes because centralized SD-WAN control policies omit the site. What verification result demonstrates the proposed fix works?

  1. An edge remains reachable for diagnostics during a simulated overlay control-plane outage without exposing public administration.
  2. The provisioned edge establishes authorized control sessions and an untrusted device is rejected during enrollment.
  3. The branch learns approved prefixes through the control plane and forwards only permitted traffic over established tunnels.
  4. An authorized administrator can manage the fabric after one manager failure while existing approved overlay forwarding continues.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

This directly validates cisco sd wan omp control route design: Data-plane tunnel presence does not guarantee that control-plane route advertisement and segmentation policy deliver needed service prefixes. The linked design intervention is: Validate OMP route advertisements and centralized policy across controllers with intended VPN and TLOC eligibility. Results concerning another subsystem do not prove this requirement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Using only the affected data-plane overlay for operational access can eliminate remote troubleshooting when the fabric fails. “Provide an appropriately secured independent management path or out-of-band recovery access for critical WAN edges” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: data-plane tunnel presence does not guarantee that control-plane route advertisement and segmentation policy deliver needed service prefixes.

B:

“Design approved CA trust, certificate lifecycle and device authorization procedures for every control node and edge” is the supported response when secure SD-WAN fabric admission requires authorized organization identifiers and valid identity trust, not just IP routing. Here the decisive response is “Validate OMP route advertisements and centralized policy across controllers with intended VPN and TLOC eligibility”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Management availability and existing data-plane forwarding have different dependencies, while loss of manageability remains an operational risk. “Design redundant supported SD-WAN Managers with backup, RBAC and regional management reachability as appropriate” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a new branch has functioning encrypted transport tunnels but receives no remote service routes because centralized SD-WAN control policies omit the site; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 162

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: A collaboration application has many multicast senders in the same group and operators propose building separate source-specific trees for every participant. Which intervention most directly corrects this failure?

  1. Evaluate bidirectional PIM or another supported distribution method against source count, RP and security requirements.
  2. Use supported MSDP or a suitable alternative interdomain multicast design with appropriate RP and source policies.
  3. Design SSM-compatible group range, sender addressing and receiver IGMPv3 support end to end.
  4. Evaluate supported SPT threshold and source-tree design for bandwidth and latency goals without creating RPF inconsistencies.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The design gap is: A dense many-to-many application can impose excessive source tree state if its delivery model ignores suitable shared bidirectional multicast designs. The recommended correction is: Evaluate bidirectional PIM or another supported distribution method against source count, RP and security requirements. Validate it through: Many sources reach approved receivers with routing state and traffic replication within designed limits.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change concerns msdp interdomain active source sharing, where Independent rendezvous points do not automatically exchange all active-source information across ASM multicast domains. The reported issue instead stems from: A dense many-to-many application can impose excessive source tree state if its delivery model ignores suitable shared bidirectional multicast designs.

C:

That change concerns igmpv3 receiver source specification, where Source-specific multicast applications need supported source-aware receiver membership signaling, commonly IGMPv3 for IPv4. In this question the necessary remedy is “Evaluate bidirectional PIM or another supported distribution method against source count, RP and security requirements”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns multicast source shortest path tree switchover, where ASM initially uses a shared RP tree and may switch to source-specific shortest-path forwarding according to design and platform behavior. The observed condition is a collaboration application has many multicast senders in the same group and operators propose building separate source-specific trees for every participant; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 163

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: A provider BGP edge restarts its control process and a peer immediately removes all routes even though the design expects transient forwarding continuity. What is the most appropriate architecture or policy correction?

  1. Enable and verify supported graceful restart with sensible stale timers and failover safeguards where appropriate.
  2. Tag routes with an approved community scheme and enforce explicit export policy at each boundary.
  3. Evaluate path attributes and supported multipath settings, then choose a design that preserves deterministic failover.
  4. Choose an aggregate policy with reviewed component-route dependencies, conservative discard behavior and correct reachability design.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The design gap is: Graceful restart depends on both peers' supported capabilities and bounded stale-route handling, not merely a routing session name. The recommended correction is: Enable and verify supported graceful restart with sensible stale timers and failover safeguards where appropriate. Validate it through: During a controlled restart, eligible forwarding continuity is maintained without retaining stale blackholed routes past limits.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change concerns BGP community-based export policy, where Manual per-prefix policy misses newly onboarded routes when attributes and export rules are not centrally classified. The reported issue instead stems from: Graceful restart depends on both peers' supported capabilities and bounded stale-route handling, not merely a routing session name.

C:

That change concerns BGP multipath equal cost eligibility, where BGP additional paths must satisfy supported multipath eligibility rules and configured maximum-path policy to share traffic. In this question the necessary remedy is “Enable and verify supported graceful restart with sensible stale timers and failover safeguards where appropriate”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns BGP aggregate summary discard behavior, where BGP aggregation can hide component failures and attract traffic for unreachable portions of the summarized prefix. The observed condition is a provider BGP edge restarts its control process and a peer immediately removes all routes even though the design expects transient forwarding continuity; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 164

During a Cisco enterprise architecture review, the team finds: A new SD-WAN edge has Internet reachability but cannot join the fabric because controller identity and certificate chain checks are not satisfied. What design assurance control should be institutionalized?

  1. Inventory the physical dependencies of each SD-WAN color before declaring path redundancy.
  2. Separate management-plane restoration targets from traffic-plane availability objectives in SLA design.
  3. Audit route policy and tenant VPN scoping when adding branches to SD-WAN regions.
  4. Monitor certificate expiration and trust-chain changes across regional SD-WAN controllers.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This design guardrail addresses cisco sd wan controller certificate trust: Secure SD-WAN fabric admission requires authorized organization identifiers and valid identity trust, not just IP routing. Long-term prevention is: Monitor certificate expiration and trust-chain changes across regional SD-WAN controllers. A generic control for another failure mode is insufficient.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Logical transport labels or TLOCs do not inherently represent independent circuits, carrier facilities or last-mile paths. “Inventory the physical dependencies of each SD-WAN color before declaring path redundancy” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: secure SD-WAN fabric admission requires authorized organization identifiers and valid identity trust, not just IP routing.

B:

“Separate management-plane restoration targets from traffic-plane availability objectives in SLA design” is the supported response when management availability and existing data-plane forwarding have different dependencies, while loss of manageability remains an operational risk. Here the decisive response is “Monitor certificate expiration and trust-chain changes across regional SD-WAN controllers”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

C:

Data-plane tunnel presence does not guarantee that control-plane route advertisement and segmentation policy deliver needed service prefixes. “Audit route policy and tenant VPN scoping when adding branches to SD-WAN regions” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a new SD-WAN edge has Internet reachability but cannot join the fabric because controller identity and certificate chain checks are not satisfied; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 165

During a resilience simulation, the architecture team notes: A headquarters site hosts revenue-critical services but all WAN connections terminate on one carrier device and one customer-edge router. Which analysis best identifies the architectural gap?

  1. An encrypted Internet overlay does not provide the same private carrier connectivity, SLA and traffic-engineering options as a qualified dedicated cloud circuit.
  2. Shortcut VPN topology changes can bypass required inspection if the WAN policy assumes every flow transits a central hub.
  3. Multiple logical VLANs on the same physical CE and provider device do not provide independent failure domains.
  4. Local interface carrier may remain up when upstream service fails, so a static route without health tracking can blackhole traffic.

Explanation

Correct Answer

C:

The relevant principle is: Multiple logical VLANs on the same physical CE and provider device do not provide independent failure domains. A valid architectural response is: Design separate CE devices, access paths and service-provider terminations in accordance with the required availability objective. The expected evidence is: An isolated CE or access-path failure does not disconnect critical traffic from its alternate WAN route.

Incorrect Answers

A:

An encrypted Internet overlay does not provide the same private carrier connectivity, SLA and traffic-engineering options as a qualified dedicated cloud circuit. “Compare direct cloud private interconnect with managed Internet VPN based on security, bandwidth, route exchange and service commitments” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: multiple logical VLANs on the same physical CE and provider device do not provide independent failure domains.

B:

“Use a security-enforcing hub design or distributed inspection architecture with explicit policy for branch-to-branch traffic” is the supported response when shortcut VPN topology changes can bypass required inspection if the WAN policy assumes every flow transits a central hub. Here the decisive response is “Design separate CE devices, access paths and service-provider terminations in accordance with the required availability objective”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Local interface carrier may remain up when upstream service fails, so a static route without health tracking can blackhole traffic. “Use supported service probing and tracked next-hop or routing convergence to withdraw an unusable primary path” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is a headquarters site hosts revenue-critical services but all WAN connections terminate on one carrier device and one customer-edge router; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 166

A campus and WAN design workshop reports: A campus user VLAN has two distribution switches, but its hosts use the physical IP of only one switch as the default gateway and lose external connectivity during maintenance. What is the most appropriate architecture or policy correction?

  1. Restore approved VLAN trunk reachability and compatible HSRP group and timer settings across both devices.
  2. Design a supported FHRP virtual gateway with aligned priorities, Layer 2 reachability and safe failover between distribution switches.
  3. Track the required upstream path and decrement priority enough for a healthy standby gateway to assume forwarding.
  4. Consider GLBP where supported or a different routed access and anycast design, based on platform capability and operational needs.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The design gap is: A single physical gateway address makes host access depend on one distribution device even when a second gateway exists. The recommended correction is: Design a supported FHRP virtual gateway with aligned priorities, Layer 2 reachability and safe failover between distribution switches. Validate it through: A test client retains the same configured default gateway address and resumes reachability through the surviving gateway after failover.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change concerns hsrp split brain and vlan consistency, where FHRP peers must exchange control messages in a correctly shared VLAN to maintain a single active forwarding role. The reported issue instead stems from: A single physical gateway address makes host access depend on one distribution device even when a second gateway exists.

C:

That change concerns hsrp upstream interface tracking, where FHRP presence alone may not account for upstream path viability without appropriate object or interface tracking. In this question the necessary remedy is “Design a supported FHRP virtual gateway with aligned priorities, Layer 2 reachability and safe failover between distribution switches”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns glbp unequal gateway load sharing, where Traditional active-standby first-hop redundancy does not by itself provide the desired per-client gateway load distribution. The observed condition is a campus user VLAN has two distribution switches, but its hosts use the physical IP of only one switch as the default gateway and lose external connectivity during maintenance; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 167

During a resilience simulation, the architecture team notes: Two distribution devices report the same routing flap five minutes apart because one device uses an unsynchronized clock. Which intervention most directly corrects this failure?

  1. Use resilient approved NTP sources with authenticated or trusted network delivery where supported.
  2. Select telemetry collection intervals and methods proportional to observed change rates and device capacity.
  3. Design appropriate collector and transport redundancy with supported failover and secure retention behavior.
  4. Design correct multicast reverse paths and compatible unicast routing so upstream interfaces pass the RPF check.

Explanation

Correct Answer

A:

The design gap is: Uncoordinated system clocks undermine log chronology, audit correlation and incident reconstruction. The recommended correction is: Use resilient approved NTP sources with authenticated or trusted network delivery where supported. Validate it through: Device event timestamps align within the accepted error range during a controlled common event.

Incorrect Answers

B:

That change concerns management telemetry sampling capacity, where Overly aggressive polling can consume limited control-plane CPU and management bandwidth without improving decision quality. The reported issue instead stems from: Uncoordinated system clocks undermine log chronology, audit correlation and incident reconstruction.

C:

That change concerns management network service redundancy, where Central monitoring infrastructure can become a single point of failure even when individual access devices have redundant uplinks. In this question the necessary remedy is “Use resilient approved NTP sources with authenticated or trusted network delivery where supported”, which this alternative does not provide.

D:

That change concerns rpf multicast source route check, where Multicast RPF typically checks the route back toward the source or RP, not merely whether a receiver destination is reachable. The observed condition is two distribution devices report the same routing flap five minutes apart because one device uses an unsynchronized clock; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 168

A campus and WAN design workshop reports: An enterprise upgrades IS-IS for high-capacity links but one region still relies on incompatible metric expectations, producing unintended path preference for long WAN circuits. What is the most relevant cause of the design failure?

  1. Protocol adjacency and IPv4 routes do not alone establish correct IPv6 reachability, interface addressing or address-family support.
  2. Mixed or unsuitable metric styles can undermine consistent path-cost planning and overflow the intended metric range.
  3. Unbounded EIGRP query scope and nontransit spokes can prolong active route computation across a large topology.
  4. Summary advertisement can attract destinations no longer reachable through the summarizing area, creating a predictable blackhole.

Explanation

Correct Answer

B:

The relevant principle is: Mixed or unsuitable metric styles can undermine consistent path-cost planning and overflow the intended metric range. A valid architectural response is: Standardize supported wide-metric design and audit interface cost policies across participating IS-IS devices. The expected evidence is: SPF paths reflect approved link costs under normal and failure cases with no accidental preference for slower WAN links.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Protocol adjacency and IPv4 routes do not alone establish correct IPv6 reachability, interface addressing or address-family support. “Implement supported IS-IS IPv6 reachability with interface family configuration and consistent topology preferences” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: mixed or unsuitable metric styles can undermine consistent path-cost planning and overflow the intended metric range.

C:

“Declare eligible nontransit branches as EIGRP stubs and summarize at appropriate aggregation points with verified alternate paths” is the supported response when unbounded EIGRP query scope and nontransit spokes can prolong active route computation across a large topology. Here the decisive response is “Standardize supported wide-metric design and audit interface cost policies across participating IS-IS devices”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

D:

Summary advertisement can attract destinations no longer reachable through the summarizing area, creating a predictable blackhole. “Advertise summaries only with valid downstream coverage or an explicitly documented safe discard and failover behavior” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is an enterprise upgrades IS-IS for high-capacity links but one region still relies on incompatible metric expectations, producing unintended path preference for long WAN circuits; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.

Question 169

An enterprise network design must address this condition: An enterprise puts SNMP, SSH and backup traffic in the same global routing table as public guest endpoints, complicating access restrictions. What is the most appropriate architecture or policy correction?

  1. Design redundant remote syslog collectors with protected transport, appropriate facilities and retention controls.
  2. Design supported SNMPv3 users, auth/privacy mechanisms, least-privilege views and central credential lifecycle.
  3. Provide secure out-of-band management through independent transport, power and authentication suitable for critical nodes.
  4. Create a supported management VRF or equivalent separated context and tightly controlled shared services as needed.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

The design gap is: A common routing table broadens the management attack surface and increases risk of route or ACL leakage. The recommended correction is: Create a supported management VRF or equivalent separated context and tightly controlled shared services as needed. Validate it through: Only authorized management clients reach device control-plane addresses while guest routes remain isolated.

Incorrect Answers

A:

That change concerns syslog centralized security retention, where Local log storage and rollover cannot substitute for reliable centralized timestamped security event retention. The reported issue instead stems from: A common routing table broadens the management attack surface and increases risk of route or ACL leakage.

B:

That change concerns snmpv3 authenticated management design, where Legacy community strings do not provide SNMPv3's user-based authentication and encryption capabilities needed by the policy. In this question the necessary remedy is “Create a supported management VRF or equivalent separated context and tightly controlled shared services as needed”, which this alternative does not provide.

C:

That change concerns out of band network management resiliency, where In-band-only management can share a fault with the network being repaired, eliminating the ability to recover remotely. The observed condition is an enterprise puts SNMP, SSH and backup traffic in the same global routing table as public guest endpoints, complicating access restrictions; this mechanism addresses another problem.

Question 170

During a resilience simulation, the architecture team notes: An enterprise creates several OSPF nonbackbone areas linked through a single fragile ABR with no alternate route into area zero. Which outcome is the strongest evidence of a correct solution?

  1. Authorized neighbors establish using agreed credentials while an unapproved device cannot form an adjacency.
  2. Routers retain intra-area reachability and a default path without carrying unnecessary external LSAs.
  3. Candidate external routes select the intended exit after internal path costs change, with no unplanned long-haul detours.
  4. A simulated ABR outage preserves supported inter-area routes through the remaining valid backbone connection.

Explanation

Correct Answer

D:

This directly validates ospf area 0 resilient backbone: OSPF hierarchical inter-area connectivity depends on a stable backbone design and resilient area border connectivity. The linked design intervention is: Design redundant ABRs with valid backbone area connectivity and deterministic cost preferences for inter-area paths. Results concerning another subsystem do not prove this requirement.

Incorrect Answers

A:

Unauthenticated routing adjacencies on a shared segment create topology-manipulation exposure and accidental peer acceptance. “Enable the appropriate supported OSPF authentication and key rollout at trusted adjacency boundaries” would remedy that alternative situation, but it would not correct the present issue: OSPF hierarchical inter-area connectivity depends on a stable backbone design and resilient area border connectivity.

B:

“Choose a supported stub-area design consistently across the area and ensure the ABR provides an appropriate default route” is the supported response when a normal area floods external routing information that stub-capable branches may not need when a default route is sufficient. Here the decisive response is “Design redundant ABRs with valid backbone area connectivity and deterministic cost preferences for inter-area paths”, so that different intervention does not meet the stated requirement.

C:

External Type 2 cost behavior does not account for internal cost in the same way as Type 1 when external metrics differ. “Select E1 or E2 route treatment to reflect the required exit preference, testing both external and internal metrics” applies to that other condition. The reported evidence is an enterprise creates several OSPF nonbackbone areas linked through a single fragile ABR with no alternate route into area zero; this alternative would address the wrong dependency.